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The Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity has become increasingly 
mindful of how implicit racial biases shape not only individuals’ cognition and at-
titudes, but also their behaviors.  Indeed, a large body of compelling research has 
demonstrated how these unconscious, automatically activated, and pervasive mental 
processes can be manifested across a variety of contexts yielding significant impacts. 
Consider these striking examples:
In a video game that simulates what 
police officers experience, research sub-
jects were instructed to “shoot” when 
an armed individual appeared on the 
screen and refrain from doing so when 
the target was instead holding an innoc-
uous object such as a camera or wallet. 
Time constraints were built into the 
study so that participants were forced 
to make nearly instantaneous decisions, 
much like police officers often must do 
in real life.  Findings indicated that participants tended to “shoot” armed tar-
gets more quickly when they were African American as opposed to White. 
When participants refrained from “shooting” an armed target, these char-
acters in the simulation tended to be White rather than African American. 
Moreover, in circumstances where the target was “shot” in error (i.e., was 
“shot” even though they were wielding a harmless object), those targets were 
more likely to be African American than White.  Research such as this high-
lights how implicit racial biases can influence decisions that have life or death 
consequences.
A 2012 study used identical case vignettes to examine how pediatricians’ im-
plicit racial attitudes affect treatment recommendations for four common pe-
diatric conditions.  Results indicated that as pediatricians’ pro-White implicit 
biases increased, they were more likely to prescribe painkillers for vignette 
subjects who were White as opposed to Black patients.  This is just one exam-
ple of how understanding implicit racial biases may help explain differential 
health care treatment, even for youths.
The Purpose and Goal of The Implicit Bias Review
The Purpose and Goal of The Implicit Bias Review
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Examining implicit bias research is important for all who work for racial justice be-
cause of the rich insights into human behavior that this work generates.  Moreover, 
as convincing research evidence accumulates, it becomes difficult to understate the 
importance of considering the role of implicit racial biases when analyzing societal 
inequities.  Implicit biases, explicit biases, and structural forces are often mutually 
reinforcing, thus multiple levels of analysis are necessary to untangle the nuances of 
these complex dynamics.
With this in mind, and as a testament to the Kirwan Institute’s belief in the impor-
tance of understanding implicit bias, we present to you this inaugural edition of our 
“State of the Science Review of Implicit Bias Learning.”  As an annual publication, 
subsequent editions of this Review will highlight the latest research findings and 
underscore trends in the field.  Our goal is to provide a comprehensive resource that 
communicates this research in a concise and accessible manner while stimulating 
further dialogue on implicit bias and its implications for the pursuit of social justice.
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““
Although not yet a widely-known concept outside of the social science community, 
knowledge of implicit bias is gradually infiltrating the public domain.  Attention 
from the media and other sources devoted to how implicit biases may have in-
fluenced voters’ decisions in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections is permeat-
ing public consciousness (see, e.g., Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 
2009; McElroy, 2012; NPR, 2012; Payne, et al., 2010). The term was also empha-
sized in an April 2012 decision by an Iowa district court judge, in a class-action suit 
brought forth by African Americans who claimed that implicit racial biases influ-
enced employment and promotion decisions for state jobs (“Iowa: Ruling for State 
in ‘Implicit Bias’ Suit,” 2012).  As the body of literature on implicit bias expands and 
the scholarship gains traction outside of academic circles, one can reasonably antic-
ipate that implicit bias will increasingly enter public discourse.
Implicit bias refers to the attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, ac-
tions, and decisions in an unconscious manner.  Among the key attributes of implicit 
biases are the following:
• Implicit or Unconscious:  Much of the literature suggests that these biases 
are activated unconsciously, involuntarily, and/or without one’s awareness or 
intentional control (see, e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, Smoak, & Gaertner, 2009; 
Greenwald & Krieger, 2006; Kang, et al., 2012; Nier, 2005; Rudman, 2004). 
The appropriateness of using terms such as ‘unconscious’ and ‘non-conscious’ 
with respect to the activation and application of implicit biases has been 
questioned by some (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Rudman, 2004).  Implicit biases 
are defined as “attitudes and stereotypes that are not consciously accessible 
through introspection”(Kang, et al., 2012, p. 1132).  This is in direct contrast 
Introduction
At the nexus of social psychology, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience has 
emerged a new body of science called “implicit social cognition” (ISC). This field focuses 
on mental processes that affect social judgments but operate without conscious awareness 
or conscious control.
– Kang & Lane, 2010, p. 467 –
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with explicit biases, meaning those that are held or endorsed on a conscious 
level.  The distinction between implicit and explicit is further discussed in 
chapter 2 of this literature review.  
• Bias:  Bias “denotes a displacement of people’s responses along a continuum 
of possible judgments” (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006, p. 950).  This bias may 
skew toward either a favorable or an unfavorable assessment (Greenwald & 
Krieger, 2006).
• Automatically Activated / Involuntary:  Implicit biases can activate with-
out intention and/or without being explicitly controlled (i.e., not deliberate) 
(Blair, 2002; Rudman, 2004).
• Pervasiveness:  Substantial research has established that implicit attitudes 
and stereotypes are robust and pervasive (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998; Kang, et al., 2012; Kang & Lane, 2010; Nosek, Smyth, et al., 2007).
The Formation of Implicit Biases
Regardless of whether implicit associations are positive or negative in nature, every-
one is susceptible to implicit biases, including children (Nosek, Smyth, et al., 2007; 
Rutland, Cameron, Milne, & McGeorge, 2005).  Implicit biases vary among indi-
viduals (see, e.g., D. M. Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2003).
The classic nature versus nurture debate is one way to approach the question of how 
our implicit associations are formed.  A nature-based argument would assert that 
biases are hardwired.  Research by Mahajan and colleagues broadly supports this ar-
gument, as they identified the existence of implicit ingroup preferences even among 
a nonhuman species, rhesus macaques (Mahajan, et al., 2011).
Renown implicit bias scholar Jerry Kang addresses the nature vs. nurture debate and 
sides with nurture, writing that “even if nature provides the broad cognitive canvas, 
nurture paints the detailed pictures – regarding who is inside and outside, what attri-
butes they have, and who counts as friend or foe” (Kang, 2012, p. 134).  Supporting 
Introduction
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this declaration, he notes how entertainment media perpetuates stereotypes, citing 
one study that documented the subtle transmission of race biases through nonverbal 
behaviors seen on television.  Exposure to nonverbal race bias on television can in-
fluence individuals’ race associations and attitudes, as “exposure to pro-white (versus 
pro-black) nonverbal bias increased viewers’ bias even though patterns of nonverbal 
behavior could not be consciously reported”(Weisbuch, Pauker, & Ambady, 2009, 
p. 1711).  Kang also discusses how news programming, particularly the excessive 
portrayal of Blacks as criminal (see, e.g., Dixon & Linz, 2000; Oliver, 2003), helps 
foster the formation of implicit biases (Kang, 2012).  He even recognizes how online 
virtual gaming worlds can contribute to implicit biases.  
Rudman (2004) outlines five factors that influence the formation of implicit orien-
tations more so than explicit ones.  She asserts that early experiences may lay the 
foundation for our implicit attitudes while explicit attitudes are more affected by 
recent events (Rudman, 2004).  Also on Rudman’s list are affective experiences (vs. 
self-reports), cultural biases (vs. explicit beliefs), and cognitive balance principles 
(Rudman, 2004).  While these previous four principles were already established in 
the literature, Rudman adds a fifth for consideration:  the self.  She writes, “it may 
be difficult to possess implicit associations that are dissociated from the self, whereas 
controlled evaluations may allow for more objective responses.  If the self proves to 
be a central cause of implicit orientations, it is likely because we do not view our-
selves impartially, and this partisanship then shapes appraisals of other objects that 
are (or are not) connected to the self ” (Rudman, 2004, p. 137).
The Importance of Implicit Bias to the Work of Social Justice Advocates
Understanding the nuances of implicit bias is critical for addressing the inequalities 
that are byproducts of structural forces.  Indeed, Kang notes that implicit biases, 
explicit biases, and structural forces are not mutually exclusive but instead often re-
inforce one another (Kang, et al., 2012).  Elsewhere he affirms this interrelation by 
writing that “the deepest understanding of any process such as racialization comes 
from multiple levels of analysis that can and should be integrated together” (Kang, 
2010, p. 1147).
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powell and Godsil emphasize that the human behavior insights gleaned from the 
study of implicit biases are key to achieving social justice goals (powell & Godsil, 
2011).  They declare that knowledge of how the brain functions, particularly how we 
understand our positioning with respect to our environment, is key for the creation 
of “a political space in which it is possible to first have a constructive dialogue about 
the continuing salience of race, then generate support for the policies necessary to 
address the role race continues to play, and finally, and as importantly, develop im-
plementation measures that will allow these policies to achieve the sought-after 
outcomes”(powell & Godsil, 2011, p. 4).
Rudman unequivocally asserts the significance of understanding implicit biases with 
these cautionary words: “for a deep and lasting equality to evolve, implicit biases 
must be acknowledged and challenged; to do otherwise is to allow them to haunt 
our minds, our homes, and our society into the next millennium”(Rudman, 2004, p. 
139).
About this Implicit Bias Review
Although a wide variety of characteristics (e.g., gender, age) can activate implicit 
biases, this literature review primarily focuses on implicit racial and ethnic biases. 
While this review is intended to be as complete as possible, it should not be regarded 
as comprehensive given the vast literature devoted to this topic.
Introduction
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Background on Implicit Bias
Key concepts
A few fundamental definitions related to mental associations are important to un-
derstand before unpacking the nuances of implicit bias.  
• Schemas are “templates of knowledge that help us to organize specific exam-
ples into broader categories” (Kang, 2008).  These mental shortcuts allow us 
to quickly assign objects, processes, and people into categories (Kang, 2009). 
For example, people may be placed into categories based on traits such as 
age, race, gender, and the like.  Once these categories have been assigned, any 
meanings that we carry associated with that category then become associ-
ated with the object, process, or person in question.  The chronic accessibil-
ity of racial schemas allow them to  shape social interactions (Kang, 2005). 
• Stereotypes are beliefs that are mentally associated with a given cate-
gory (Blair, 2002; Greenwald & Krieger, 2006).  For example, Asians are 
often stereotyped as being good at math, and the elderly are often ste-
reotyped as being frail.  These associations – both positive and nega-
tive – are routinized enough that they generally are automatically ac-
cessed (Rudman, 2004). Stereotypes are not necessarily accurate and may 
even reflect associations that we would consciously reject (Reskin, 2005). 
• Attitudes are evaluative feelings, such as having a positive or negative feeling 
towards something or someone (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006; Kang, 2009). 
• Ingroups and Outgroups – As soon as we see someone, we automatically 
categorize him or her as either ‘one of us’, that is, a member of our ingroup, 
or different from ourselves, meaning a member of our outgroup.  Making this 
simple ‘us vs. them’ distinction is an automatic process that happens within 
seconds of meeting someone (Reskin, 2005).  Deservedly or not, ingroup bias 
leads to relative favoritism compared to outgroup members (Greenwald & 
Krieger, 2006).  We extrapolate characteristics about ourselves to other in-
group members, assuming that they are like us compared to outgroup mem-
bers (Reskin, 2005).  By favoring ingroup members, we tend to grant them 
Background on Implicit Bias
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a measure of our trust and regard them in a positive light (Reskin, 2005). 
This ingroup favoritism surfaces often on measures of implicit bias (see, e.g., 
Greenwald, et al., 1998).  The strength of ingroup bias has been illustrated in 
various studies.  For example, research has found that people tend to display 
ingroup bias even when group members are randomly assigned (Tajfel, Billig, 
Bundy, & Flament, 1971), and, even more incredibly, when groups are com-
pletely fictitious (Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteith, 2001).
Moreover, given the dynamics of race in our society, it is no surprise that exten-
sive research has documented White Americans’ implicit ingroup bias and relative 
bias against African Americans (see, e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Dasgupta, 
McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaert-
ner, 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, et al., 1998; McConnell & Liebold, 2001; 
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Richeson & Ambady, 2003).
Select Seminal Works
Laying the foundation for implicit bias research was a 1983 seminal article by Gaert-
ner and McLaughlin.  Employing a lexical decision task, they found that research 
subjects, regardless of their personal prejudices, were reliably faster at pairing posi-
tive attitudes with Whites than with Blacks (in experiment 1) or with Negroes (in 
experiment 2) (Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983).  However, negative attributes were 
equally associated with Blacks and Whites.  This article is regarded as the first piece 
to demonstrate implicit stereotyping.  
In 1989, an article by Patricia G. Devine was the first to argue that “stereotypes 
and personal beliefs are conceptually distinct cognitive structures” (Devine, 1989, p. 
5).  Her dissociation model differentiated between automatic processes (i.e., those 
that “involve the unintentional or spontaneous activation of some well-learned set 
of associations or responses that have been developed through repeated activation 
in memory”) and controlled processes (i.e., those that are “intentional and require 
the active attention of the individual”) (Devine, 1989, p. 6).  Devine tested the im-
plications of this dissociation model with respect to prejudice and found that in-
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dividuals can hold a “clear distinction between knowledge of a racial stereotype … 
and personal beliefs about the stereotyped group” (Devine, 1989, p. 15).  In short, 
automatic and controlled processes can be dissociated such that an individual can 
rate as low-prejudiced while still holding knowledge of the existence of that given 
stereotype in his/her memory system.  
Following this dissociation revelation, researchers who studied automatic associa-
tions generally regarded them as automatic and inflexible; that is, these associations 
were deemed spontaneously triggered and inescapable (Bargh, 1997, 1999; Devine, 
1989; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992).  This notion of these associations being automatic 
and unavoidable led to the conclusion that biases remained stable over time and, be-
cause they were so deep seated, were not open to manipulation.  In a seminal work, 
Irene V. Blair upended this notion by establishing that automatic stereotypes and 
prejudice are, in fact, malleable (Blair, 2002).  She found that automatic stereotypes 
and prejudices may be moderated by events such as contextual cues, the perceivers’ 
focus of attention, and the perceivers’ motivation to maintain a positive self-image, 
among others (Blair, 2002).  Other researchers built on this scholarly foundation, 
suggesting that even if automatic, stereotype activation is not necessarily uncontrol-
lable (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000).  
These works opened up the door to a plethora of research that further examined the 
nature of associations, how implicit biases operate, and ways in which they may be 
countered.  This body of work will be further discussed throughout the course of this 
literature review.
Understanding the Relationship Between Implicit and Explicit Bias
Implicit and explicit biases are generally regarded as related yet distinct concepts 
(Kang, 2009; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).  They are not mutually exclusive 
and may even reinforce each other (Kang, et al., 2012).  “Neither should be viewed 
as the solely ‘accurate’ or ‘authentic’ measure of bias” (Kang, 2009, p. 3).
The main distinction between implicit and other types of bias centers on level of 
awareness (Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2009).  Explicit biases “can be consciously detect-
Background on Implicit Bias
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ed and reported” (D. M. Amodio & Mendoza, 2010, p. 355).  Processes that are not 
explicit are implicit, meaning that they occur without introspective awareness (D. 
M. Amodio & Mendoza, 2010; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, et al., 2000). 
Explicit attitudes tend to be associated with deliberate responses that individuals 
can control (Dovidio, et al., 1997; Nier, 2005).  They are often measured by instru-
ments such as feeling thermometers and semantic differentials, in addition to other 
forms of direct questioning. 
Given that implicit associations arise outside of conscious awareness, these associ-
ations do not necessarily align with individuals’ openly-held beliefs or even reflect 
stances one would explicitly endorse (Graham & Lowery, 2004; Kang, et al., 2012; 
Reskin, 2005).
Following the 1989 debut of Devine’s dissociation model, further research has 
explored the idea of whether implicit and explicit biases are dissociated (see, e.g., 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Dovidio, et al., 1997; Green, et al., 2007; Greenwald 
& Banaji, 1995; Nier, 2005).  A vast body of empirical literature documents studies 
in which respondents’ implicit and explicit attitudes do not align (see, e.g., Cun-
ningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Dasgupta, et al., 2000; Devine, 1989; Dunton 
& Fazio, 1997; Fazio, et al., 1995; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald, et al., 1998; 
Phelps, et al., 2000; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997).  That said, the liter-
ature is inconsistent and hardly conclusive, as other studies have found that implicit 
and explicit attitudes seem to align, thus calling into question this notion of disso-
ciation (see, e.g., McConnell & Liebold, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).  
To help get to the root of this debate about dissociation, Hofmann et al. performed 
a meta-analysis to examine the correlation between a measure of implicit bias (the 
Implicit Association Test, discussed in-depth in chapter 3) and explicit self-report 
measures.  Analyzing this across 126 studies, they uncovered a mean effect size of 
0.24, which is relatively small yet significant (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, 
Le, & Schmitt, 2005).  Thus, their meta-analysis concluded that this implicit mea-
sure and explicit self-reports are systemically related rather than dissociated.  They 
also noted that variations in correlations between implicit and explicit measures can 
be attributed to how spontaneous the self-reports are and the degree of conceptual 
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correspondence between measures (Hofmann, et al., 2005).    
In a search to explain these seemingly contradictory results between implicit and ex-
plicit measures, other factors have been identified as moderating variables (Rudman, 
2004).  These include individual motivation to report explicit attitudes that align 
with one’s implicit attitudes (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Fazio, et al., 1995; Nier, 2005), 
the psychometric properties of the specific measurement techniques (Cunningham, 
et al., 2001; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) and impression management or 
social desirability concerns, as discussed in the next section (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; 
Nier, 2005; Nosek & Banaji, 2002).
Downfalls of self-reports and other explicit measures of bias
Early researchers relied on explicit measurements of prejudice, such as the Bogardus 
Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1933).  But as norms discouraging prejudice gained 
societal traction, straightforward approaches to measuring bias became less useful 
and increasingly suspect.  Researchers were left to wonder whether stereotypes were 
fading, whether the content of stereotypes had changed, or whether people were 
simply suppressing their negative views of others (D. Amodio & Devine, 2009).  
The downfalls of self-reports have been well-documented since at least the 1960s 
(Orne, 1962; Weber & Cook, 1972). Impression management can undermine the 
validity of self-report measures of bias, as the desire to be perceived positively can 
influence people to distort their self-reported beliefs and attitudes (D. Amodio & 
Devine, 2009; Dovidio, et al., 1997; Fazio, et al., 1995; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; 
Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Nier, 2005; Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2007).  In 1971, Harold Sigall and colleagues famously exposed how social 
desirability can taint self-reports by employing a “bogus pipeline” machine that the 
researchers claimed would reveal participants’ true inner attitudes ( Jones & Sigall, 
1971; Sigall & Page, 1971).  The portion of participants who were led to believe in 
the effectiveness of the machine reported attitudes that more closely reflected their 
true beliefs compared to those who did not believe they were being monitored and 
thus were free to distort their responses to whatever they deemed was socially appro-
priate (Sigall & Page, 1971).  The underlying principles of the bogus pipeline’s mild 
Background on Implicit Bias
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deception have become a classic technique that is still employed in current research 
on an array of topics (see, e.g., Myers & Zeigler-Hill, 2012; Nier, 2005).  
This inclination for impression management that distorts the validity of self-reports 
is particularly likely when individuals are questioned about politically or socially 
sensitive topics such as interracial or intergroup behaviors (Dovidio, et al., 2009; 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009).  As such, self-re-
ports are generally regarded as being inadequate for capturing all aspects of individ-
ual prejudice (Tinkler, 2012), although other researchers have indicated that they 
may still be accurate when used in conjunction with implicit measures (Greenwald, 
Poehlman, et al., 2009) or when used on people who have low motivation to control 
their prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997).
On controlling responses
The notion of what processes are automatic or controlled has received further exam-
ination following Devine’s 1989 seminal work.  
It is important to note that implicit and automatic are not perfect synonyms, nor 
are explicit and controlled.  Amodio and Mendoza conceptualize automatic pro-
cesses as those that are unintentional while controlled processes are intentional and 
often goal-oriented (D. M. Amodio & Mendoza, 2010).  Defining  control, they 
write, “Control does not relate to content per se, such as an explicit belief, but rather 
to the deliberate adjudication of an endorsed response over a different, undesired 
response”(D. M. Amodio & Mendoza, 2010, p. 355).  They note that while auto-
maticity and implicitness may align, ultimately whether responses are automatic or 
controlled is distinct from the implicit or explicit nature of a response (D. M. Amo-
dio & Mendoza, 2010).
Providing support for the value of automatic associations, Reskin writes of their 
“survival value,” noting that it is impossible for individuals to consciously process all 
of the stimuli around us, thus automatic associations release cognitive resources for 
other uses (Reskin, 2005, p. 34).
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Racial attitude work by Fazio and colleagues led to the distinction of three types of 
individuals that differ due to what processes are automatically activated in them and 
how they then do or do not counter or control those evaluations (Fazio, et al., 1995). 
One group is comprised of individuals who are non-prejudiced; in Fazio’s work 
these are the folks who do not experience the activation of negative attitudes toward 
Black people.  A second grouping captures those who are truly prejudiced, meaning 
those who experience a negative automatic association and do nothing to negate or 
control expression of that association.  Finally, a third grouping involves those who 
may experience a negative automatic association but, like those in Devine 1989, are 
motivated to counter that sentiment.
Building on this work, researchers have identified several factors that influence indi-
viduals’ abilities to control responses or act in a manner that is consistent with one’s 
explicit position.  These factors include:
The role of motivation
Individual motivation is a commonly cited factor in the controlling responses 
literature.  For example, Dunton and Fazio studied the role of motivation 
on how people differ in the extent to which they seek to control expressions 
of prejudice.  They found that motivation to control prejudiced reactions 
stemmed from two sources: one being a concern with acting prejudiced, and 
the other being a desire to avoid dispute or confrontation regarding one’s 
thoughts or positions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997).  Dunton and Fazio also con-
cluded that self-reports of racial attitudes can be reasonably accurate for in-
dividuals with low motivation to control prejudiced reactions (Dunton & 
Fazio, 1997).  
Work by Devine et al. found that the implicit and explicit racial biases dis-
played by participants were a function of their internal and external motiva-
tion to respond in a non-prejudiced manner, with explicit biases moderated by 
internal motivation and implicit biases moderated by the interaction of both 
internal and external motivation (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & 
Vance, 2002).
Background on Implicit Bias
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Relatedly, researchers have explored how motivation can lead to people “over-
correcting” for their biases.  Work such as that by Olson and Fazio found that 
some participants sought to control the racial attitudes they exhibited, and 
in so doing, over-corrected to display a exaggeratedly positive or negative 
response that concealed their true attitudes (Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Earlier 
work by Dunton and Fazio concluded that prejudiced people who are highly 
motivated to control their prejudiced reactions may overcompensate for their 
automatically activated negativity (Dunton & Fazio, 1997).  Regarding the 
extent of this overcorrection, they found that individuals’ “high motivation 
to control prejudiced reactions led to the expression of judgments that were 
more positive than the responses of individuals for whom positivity was acti-
vated” (Dunton & Fazio, 1997, p. 324).  Additional research found this same 
trend toward motivation moderating bias overcorrection (Towles-Schwen, 
2003).  This phenomena of overcorrection aligns closely with Wegener and 
Petty’s Flexible Correction Model (see Wegener & Petty, 1995).
Also attesting to the significance of the role of motivation, multiple research-
ers have developed scales designed to measure the effect of motivation on 
controlling prejudiced reactions.  Dunton and Fazio developed a Motivation 
to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale that aimed to measure individual dif-
ferences in motivation (Dunton & Fazio, 1997).  Similarly, Plant and Devine 
developed two measures for assessing motivations to respond without prej-
udice, the Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS) 
and the External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (EMS) 
(Plant & Devine, 1998). 
The role of time
Another widely regarded factor that influences decision-making and whether 
individuals are able to control their reactions is time (Kruglanski & Freund, 
1983; Payne, 2006; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990).  Time pressures have been 
shown to be a condition in which implicit attitudes may appear (Bertrand, 
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Chugh, & Mullainathan, 2005), even despite explicit attempts at control.  
The role of cognitive “busyness”
In the words of Reskin, “anything that taxes our attention – multiple demands, 
complex tasks, time pressures – increases the likelihood of our stereotyping” 
(Reskin, 2005, p. 34).  Gilbert and Hixon studied how cognitive busyness can 
affect the activation and application of stereotypes.  They found that cognitive 
busyness can decrease the likelihood of stereotype activation; however, should 
the stereotype be activated, cognitive busyness makes it more likely that that 
stereotype will be applied to the individual(s) in question (Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991).  Similarly, in an experimental design, Payne found that the group that 
was cognitively overloaded showed more bias, which he regards as a byprod-
uct of individuals’ reduced level of control over their responses (Payne, 2006). 
Finally, Bertrand et al. cite three conditions that are conducive to the rise of 
implicit attitudes, including lack of attention being paid to a task, time con-
straints or cognitive load, and ambiguity (Bertrand, et al., 2005).
Monitoring verbal behaviors but not nonverbals (known as leakages)
While people can monitor their verbal behaviors pretty well, they do not 
monitor and control their nonverbal behaviors as effectively or as often; the 
prejudiced attitudes they are trying to conceal can “leak,” thereby revealing 
their true stances (Dovidio, et al., 1997; Fazio, et al., 1995; Olson & Fazio, 
2007; Stone & Moskowitz, 2011).
Background on Implicit Bias
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While implicit measures are less likely to be tainted by impression management tac-
tics, measuring implicit biases remains a challenging task.  Legal scholar Jerry Kang 
articulates the challenges of learning about people’s implicit biases as a two part 
(“willing and able”) problem (Kang, 2009, p. 2).  As noted above, some people are 
unwilling to share their true feelings with researchers in order to maintain a sense of 
political correctness.  
In terms of the “able” part of Kang’s assertion, the challenges of assessing implicit 
biases are compounded by the fact that some people may be unable to share their 
implicit biases.  Broadly speaking, we are weak at introspection and therefore often 
unaware of our own biases (Greenwald, et al., 2002; Kang, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977; Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007; Nosek & Riskind, 2012; Wilson & Dunn, 
2004).  Explicit measures such as self-reports can only reflect what we believe to be 
true about ourselves, which may be an incomplete assessment (Rudman, 2004).
Similarly, Nosek and colleagues provide a three-part assessment of why implicit 
measures (in this case, the Implicit Association Test, discussed later in this chapter) 
and self-reports differ, including:
1. “the individual is unaware of the implicitly measured associations and uses 
introspection to generate a unique explicit response;
2. the individual is aware of the implicitly measured associations, but genuinely 
rejects them as not conforming to his or her belief system and so reports a 
distinct explicit response; or
3. the individual is aware of the implicit associations, but chooses to report an 
alternative explicit response due to social concern about the acceptability of 
such a response.” (Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007, p. 282)
As the credibility of bias self-reports were increasingly questioned, calls came for 
greater use of indirect measures and unobtrusive measures that accurately captured 
racial attitudes, as implicit measures are regarded as less susceptible to social desir-
ability concerns (D. M. Amodio & Mendoza, 2010; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Gre-
enwald & Banaji, 1995; Jones & Sigall, 1971; Nosek & Banaji, 2002; Petty, et al., 
2009; von Hippel, et al., 1997).  Since that time, researchers have developed numer-
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ous instruments and techniques designed to measure cognitions implicitly.  Because 
implicit measures do not ask research subjects directly for a verbal report, in many 
cases the subjects may not even be aware of what constructs are being assessed and 
measured, thereby minimizing social desirability concerns (Fazio & Olson, 2003). 
This chapter provides a brief overview of several of these instruments.
Physiological approaches
Physiological instruments assess bodily and neurological reactions to stimuli.  These 
instruments provide insights into implicit biases because they measure reactions that 
are not easily controlled, and the individuals involved may not even realize that they 
are reacting in any manner whatsoever.
In one study, Phelps et al. (2000) used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
(fMRI) to examine unconscious evaluations of Blacks and Whites.  The amygdala 
was of particular interest because of its known role in race-related mental processes 
(Hart, et al., 2000).  It is also the part of the brain that reacts to fear and threat (Da-
vis & Whalen, 2001; Pichon, Gelder, & Grèzes, 2009; Whalen, et al., 2001).  Phelps 
and colleagues found that White subjects generally showed greater amygdala acti-
vation when exposed to unfamiliar Black faces compared to unfamiliar White faces; 
however, the fMRI data lacked any consistent patterns of amygdala activity when 
the subjects were viewing well-known Black and White faces (Phelps, et al., 2000). 
The researchers also examined the association between the strength of amygdala 
activation and other measures of race evaluation.  They found that the amygdala 
activity for unfamiliar faces correlated with two different unconscious measures of 
race evaluation but not with explicit measures of racial bias.  Overall, their research 
indicated that the amygdala response of White subjects to Black faces versus White 
faces is a byproduct of cultural evaluations that have been modified by individuals’ 
experiences (Phelps, et al., 2000).
Similarly, Cunningham et al. compared a measure of implicit racial bias to amygdala 
activity and found a significant correlation between the two (Cunningham, et al., 
2004).  In short, higher levels of anti-Black implicit bias were associated with greater 
amygdala activity, as measured by fMRI (Cunningham, et al., 2004).   
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These conclusions align with that of Lieberman et al. (2005) wherein researchers 
found that the amygdalas of both African American and Caucasian participants dis-
played greater levels of activity when viewing African American faces than Cauca-
sian American faces (Lieberman, Hariri, Jarcho, Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 2005). 
Lieberman et al. suggest that the amygdala activity recorded in this study reflect 
“culturally learned negative associations regarding African-American individuals” 
(Lieberman, et al., 2005, 722).  Additional research expanded on Phelps et al. (2000) 
and Lieberman et al.’s (2005) studies by finding that beyond race, skin tone varia-
tions also affect amygdala activation, with darker skin tones provoking more amyg-
dala activity than lighter tones (Ronquillo, et al., 2007).  
Further research on the neural basis of implicit biases articulated a three-part model 
in which the amygdala is only one component.  Stanley and colleagues’ model assert-
ed that the anterior cingulate is involved in the detection of implicit attitudes, and 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortices help regulate implicit biases (Stanley, Phelps, & 
Banaji, 2008).  This conclusion aligns with earlier work by Cunningham et al. that 
suggested that the controlled processes that originate in the anterior cingulated and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex can override the automatic processing of Black and 
White faces that occurs in the amygdala (Cunningham, et al., 2004).   
Vanman et al. (2004) explored another physiological approach to measuring implicit 
prejudices.  They used facial electromyography (EMG) to examine the micro-move-
ments of muscles used in smiling and frowning while exposing research participants 
to images of White and Black faces and ultimately concluded that facial EMG can 
be used as an implicit measure of racial prejudice related to discrimination (Vanman, 
Saltz, Nathan, & Warren, 2004).  
Finally, work by Bascovich and colleagues employed cardiovascular  and hemody-
namic measures as a means to understanding how study participants responded to 
stigmatized individuals (in this case, individuals perceived to have port-wine birth-
marks on their faces) (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001).    
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Priming methods
In psychological terms, priming is simply the act of being exposed to a stimulus that 
influences how an individual later responds to a different stimulus.  Often used in 
experimental settings, priming methods typically feature a subliminal initial prime 
that influences or increases the sensitivity of the respondent’s later judgments or be-
haviors (Tinkler, 2012).  Implicit racial bias research often uses a race-related term 
or image as the initial stimulus, followed by the measurement of a later stimulus that 
compares responses by participants who were shown a race-related prime versus 
those who were not.  For example, Philip Goff and colleagues conducted a study in 
which they primed some participants with Black faces, White faces, or a non-facial 
control image.  Participants were then presented degraded images of animals that 
gradually came into focus, making the animal incrementally easier to identify.  
As hypothesized, the research team found that participants who were primed with 
Black male faces required fewer image frames to identify drawings of apes compared 
to those primed by White male faces or when not primed at all, yet participants 
remained unaware that they had ever been primed in any fashion (Goff, Eberhardt, 
Williams, & Jackson, 2008).  These kinds of priming methods are thought to yield 
insights on associations that, despite their implicit nature, influence individuals’ per-
ceptions. 
Response latency measures
Response latency measures represent “the most widely used strategies to assess im-
plicit prejudice” (Dovidio, et al., 2009, p. 170).  These measures rely on reaction times 
to specific tasks to uncover individuals’ biases (Rudman, 2004).  The quick speed 
of reply assumes that responses are uncontaminated and reflected “true” content of 
stereotypes (D. Amodio & Devine, 2009).  The underlying premise of these reac-
tion-time studies is that individuals are able to complete cognitively simple tasks rel-
atively more quickly than those that are mentally challenging (Kang & Lane, 2010). 
Thus, measuring the difference in response latency times can provide insights into 
how strongly two concepts are associated.  While the premise may not sound partic-
ularly sophisticated, reaction-time instruments Kang and Lane assert that these are 
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the most reliable measures of implicit cognitions (Kang & Lane, 2010).
Implicit Association Test
One of the most popular, sophisticated, and recognizable response latency mea-
sures is the Implicit Association Test (IAT).  Pioneered by Anthony Greenwald and 
colleagues, the IAT measures the relative strength of associations between pairs of 
concepts (Greenwald, et al., 1998; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001).  These associations 
addressed by the IAT include “attitudes (concept-valence associations), stereotypes 
(group-trait associations), self-concepts or identities (self-trait or self-group asso-
ciations), and self-esteem (self-valence associations)” (Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 
2009, p. 19).  The IAT operates “on the assumption that if an attitude object evokes a 
particular evaluation (positive or negative), it will facilitate responses to other evalu-
atively congruent and co-occurring stimuli” (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001, p. 801). 
Stated another way, the IAT asks respondents to sort concepts and measures any 
time differences between schema-consistent pairs and schema-inconsistent pairs 
(Kang, et al., 2012).  As a response latency measure, the IAT operates on the sup-
position that when the two concepts are highly associated, the sorting task will be 
easier and thus require less time than when the concepts are not as highly associated 
(Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Reskin, 2005).  This difference in mean response laten-
cy is known as the IAT effect (D. M. Amodio & Mendoza, 2010; Greenwald, et al., 
1998).  The time differentials of the IAT effect have been found to be statistically 
significant and not simply due to random chance (Kang, 2009).  The IAT effect 
reveals the role of both automatic and controlled processing: the strength of an 
automatic association and the challenge associated with sorting a bias-inconsistent 
pair (D. M. Amodio & Mendoza, 2010).  Some studies have found IAT results to 
be generally stable over time (Cunningham, et al., 2001; Egloff, Schwerdtfeger, & 
Schmukle, 2005).
One notable benefit to the IAT is that is relatively resistant to social desirability con-
cerns (Greenwald, et al., 1998).  Numerous studies have examined whether individ-
uals can “fake out” the IAT by intentionally controlling their responses in such a way 
as to produce desired rather than authentic results.  Outcomes and musings from 
these studies are varied (see, e.g., Cvencek, Greenwald, Brown, Gray, & Snowden, 
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2010; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Fiedler, Messner, & 
Bluemke, 2006; Kim, 2003; Steffens, 2004).  That said, studies that compare in-
dividuals’ explicit responses with their implicit attitudes, as measured by the IAT 
,consistently find that the people’s implicit biases are actually higher than what they 
self-report (Nosek, et al., 2002; Sabin, Nosek, Greenwald, & Rivara, 2009).  This 
finding aligns well with the social desirability/impression management literature 
discussed in the previous chapter.
Since its conception, researchers have subjected the IAT to numerous and rigor-
ous tests of its reliability (see, e.g. Bosson, William B. Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Greenwald & Nosek, 
2001; Kang & Lane, 2010; Nosek, Greenwald, et al., 2007).  Similarly, the validity 
of the IAT has been examined extensively (for overviews and meta-analyses, see 
Greenwald; Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009; Jost, et al., 2009).  Studies designed 
to probe the IAT’s internal validity have been particularly extensive, with research-
ers examining potential confounds such as the familiarity of the stimuli (Dasgupta, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003; Dasgupta, et al., 2000), the order of the tasks (Green-
wald, et al., 1998; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005), previous experience with the 
IAT (Dasgupta, et al., 2000; Greenwald, et al., 2003), and various procedural nuanc-
es (Greenwald, et al., 1998; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001), among others.
Of particular interest to many researchers is the question of the IAT’s predictive 
validity (see, e.g., Blanton, et al., 2009; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Greenwald & Krieger, 2006; Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009; McConnell 
& Liebold, 2001).  Is the IAT able to accurately predict attitudes and behaviors, and 
if so, can it do so better than explicit self-reports?  Greenwald and colleagues’ 2009 
meta-analysis addressed the predictive validity of the IAT in 122 research reports.  
Overall they found a predictive validity of r = 0.274 for the IAT, which is regarded 
as moderate (Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009).  Explicit measures were also effec-
tive predictors (r = 0.361); however, the predictive validity of these explicit self-re-
port measures declined dramatically when the topic was socially sensitive.  Thus, for 
topics such as interracial and intergroup behavior, the IAT held greater predictive 
validity than the self-reports did, which justifies the IAT’s use, particularly when in 
combination with self-report measures (Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009).
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As a whole, the IAT has performed extremely well to this scrutiny of reliability and 
validity, so much so that a 2010 article concluded, “After a decade of research, we be-
lieve that the IAT has demonstrated enough reliability and validity that total denial 
is implausible”(Kang & Lane, 2010, p. 477).
IAT Findings on Race
One of the most well-known versions of the IAT is the Black/White IAT, which 
examines the speed with which individuals categorize White and Black faces with 
positive and negative words.  Faster reaction times when pairing White faces with 
positive words and Black faces with negative terms suggests the presence of implicit 
pro-White/anti-Black bias.  Considerable research has indicated that most Ameri-
cans, regardless of race, display a pro-White/anti-Black bias on this IAT (Dovidio, 
et al., 2002; Greenwald, et al., 1998; Greenwald, Poehlman, et al., 2009; McConnell 
& Liebold, 2001; Nosek, et al., 2002), even in children as young as six years old (A. 
S. Baron & Banaji, 2006).
The documented presence of pro-White bias even among nonwhites has intrigued 
researchers that study ingroup/outgroup dynamics.  Dasgupta sheds light on the 
internal conflict that may help explain this unusual finding when she writes, “In 
the case of individuals who belong to disadvantaged or subordinate groups … the 
desire to protect self-esteem should lead to ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias, 
but the desire to maintain current social arrangements leads to predictions of out-
group favoritism” (Dasgupta, 2004, p. 148).  This leads Dasgupta to question whether 
there are two separate sources of implicit attitudes – one that focuses on one’s group 
membership, and another that seeks to maintain current social hierarchies (Dasgup-
ta, 2004).  Several studies lean towards the latter explanation, citing the presence of 
implicit outgroup favoritism (or, in some cases, less ingroup favoritism) for a domi-
nant outgroup over one’s own subordinated ingroup (Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles, & 
Monteith, 2003; Nosek, et al., 2002; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002).  
Implicit Biases and the Effects on Behavior
Regardless of how they are measured, researchers agree that implicit biases have 
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real-world effects on behavior (Dasgupta, 2004; Kang, et al., 2012; Rooth, 2007). 
These effects have been shown to manifest themselves in several different forms, 
including interpersonal interactions.  For example, McConnell and Liebold found 
that as White participants’ IAT scores reflected  relatively more positive attitudes to-
wards Whites than Blacks; social interactions (measured by focusing on 13 specific 
behaviors) with a White experimenter were more positive than interactions with a 
Black experimenter.  In this study, larger IAT effect scores “predicted greater speak-
ing time, more smiling, more extemporaneous social comments, fewer speech errors, 
and few speech hesitations in interactions with the White (vs Black) experimenter” 
(McConnell & Liebold, 2001, p. 439).  Another study by Dovidio et al. found that 
White individuals with higher levels of racial bias blinked more and maintained less 
visual contact with Black interviewers than White ones (Dovidio, et al., 1997).  
Several studies look at interracial interactions and behaviors with a focus on friend-
liness to examine how implicit biases can affect behavior (Dasgupta, 2004; Dovidio, 
et al., 2002; Fazio, et al., 1995; Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & Hip-
pel, 2003).  Perceptions of friendliness are often but not necessarily entirely assessed 
through nonverbal body language, such as having an open vs. closed posture or de-
gree of eye contact maintained.  These behaviors are insightful because individuals 
are often relatively unaware of such actions and thereby unlikely to attempt to con-
trol or correct these behaviors (Dasgupta, 2004).  In one study, Dovidio, Kawakami, 
and Gaertner established that the implicit biases of White participants significantly 
predicted the degree of nonverbal friendliness they displayed towards their Black 
partners in an experimental setting (Dovidio, et al., 2002).  This result echoes earlier 
work by Fazio et al. that found that White students who possessed more negative 
attitudes towards Blacks were less friendly and less interested during their interac-
tions with a Black experimenter (Fazio, et al., 1995).   
Having established that implicit biases affect individuals’ behaviors, the next logi-
cal step is to consider the ramifications of those behaviors.  Indeed, implicit biases 
have a tremendous impact on numerous social situations.  In the words of Rudman, 
“biases that we do not acknowledge but that persist, unchallenged, in the recesses of 
our minds, undoubtedly shape our society” (Rudman, 2004, p. 130).  The next three 
chapters examine how implicit racial biases affect three specific realms:  education, 
criminal justice, and health/health care.  
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Implicit bias in Education
Implicit bias can permeate educational settings in several forms, all of which can 
yield disadvantageous consequences for students of color.  Teacher expectations of 
student achievement, teacher perceptions of student behavior, and students’ self-per-
ceptions are three key themes highlighted in the literature.
Teacher Expectations of Student Achievement
Teacher expectations related to student achievement is one area in which implicit 
biases can have detrimental effects.  A 2010 study by van den Bergh et al. sought to 
determine whether teachers’ expectations for students and the ethnic achievement 
gaps found in their classrooms were related to the teachers’ prejudiced attitudes. 
Conducted in the Netherlands, researchers assessed the prejudiced attitudes of el-
ementary school teachers using self-reports and results from Implicit Association 
Tests.  Results indicated that “teachers generally hold differential expectations of 
students from different ethnic origins” and that implicit prejudiced attitudes were 
responsible for these differential expectations as well as the ethnic achievement gap 
in their classrooms (van den Bergh, Denessen, Hornstra, Voeten, & Holland, 2010). 
van den Bergh et al. assert that teachers who hold negative prejudiced attitudes 
“appeared more predisposed to evaluate their ethnic minority students as being less 
intelligent and having less promising prospects for their school careers” (van den 
Bergh, et al., 2010, p. 518).
Indeed, many studies have shown that teacher expectations tend to vary based on 
the demographic characteristics of their students.  Tenenbaum and Ruck (2007) per-
formed a meta-analysis to determine whether teachers’ expectations, referrals (i.e., 
recommendations for special education, disciplinary action, or gifted programs), and 
speech patterns (i.e., positive, neutral, and negative speech) differ toward European 
American students as opposed to African American, Asian, or Latino/a students. 
They found statistically significant results that teachers hold lower expectations for 
African American and Latino/a children compared to European American children, 
and, per the Pygmalion Effect, these expectations may affect student academic per-
formance (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968; Tenenbaum & Ruck, 2007).  The results of 
this study align with previous meta-analyses (R. M. Baron, Tom, & Cooper, 1985; 
Dusek & Joseph, 1983).
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McKown and Weinstein (2002) affirmed the role of teacher expectancy effects on 
the achievement of African American students.  Using a sample of 561 elementary 
school children, the researchers examined whether students’ ethnicity played a role 
in their susceptibility to teacher expectancy effects.  By conceptualizing teacher ex-
pectations as the degree to which teachers over- or under-estimated achievement 
compared to the students’ actual academic performance, McKown and Weinstein 
found that African American children are more likely than Caucasian children “to 
confirm teacher underestimates of ability and less likely to benefit from teacher 
overestimates of ability” (McKown & Weinstein, 2002, p. 176).  Thus, implicit biases 
held by teachers, that affect the expectations they hold for students, have real conse-
quences in the classroom for African Americans.
Students’ verbal nuances and vernacular dialects can also arouse implicit biases in 
teachers.  Following an assertion by Christian (1997) that “people who hear a ver-
nacular dialect make erroneous assumptions about the speaker’s intelligence, moti-
vation, and even morality,” Cross et al. (2001) asked prospective teachers to blindly 
evaluate the personal characteristics of anonymous speakers reading a neutral and 
minimally difficult passage, judging the speakers’ intelligence, personality, social sta-
tus, and ambition (Christian, 1997, p. 43; Cross, DeVaney, & Jones, 2001).  The 
prospective teachers were found to draw conclusions about these traits based on 
perceptions of dialect, and ethnicity was one factor that influenced these judgments; 
White prospective teachers regarded White speakers as most favorable and Black 
speakers as least favorable (Cross, et al., 2001).  With White women comprising 
the majority of our nation’s teachers (84% of public school teachers in 2011 were 
White), ostensibly trivial issues such as dialects can implicitly affect teachers’ pre-
conceptions of students (Feistritzer, 2011).  Cross et al. warns that biases stemming 
from verbal nuances can snowball, as “teachers’ preconceptions of students may be 
reflected in students’ grades and impact their self-perception, beginning a cycle of 
self-fulfilling prophecy that contributes to the eventual academic failure of speakers 
of nonstandard dialect” (Cross, et al., 2001, p. 223).  
Finally, Ferguson notes that the oft-reported Black-White test score gap can influ-
ence teachers to develop stereotypical perceptions, expectations, and behaviors that 
most likely perpetuate this gap in test scores (R. F. Ferguson, 2003).  For instance, 
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teachers may be less likely to help and support Black children than White children 
because they may underestimate Blacks’ intellectual potential.  If Black students are 
taught by educators who do not believe in their full potential, these subtle biases can 
accumulate over time to create a substandard educational environment that fails to 
prepare at-risk students to become fully contributing members of society.
In short, teacher expectations of student achievement may be swayed by implicit 
biases, and the manifestations of these biases can have lasting effects on students and 
serve as self-fulfilling prophecies (for more on self-fulfilling prophecies, see Merton, 
1957).  Holding lower standards for nonwhite students is particularly dishearten-
ing in light of studies that find that holding students to higher standards benefits 
students and actually improves test scores (Betts & Grogger, 2003; Figlio & Lucas, 
2004).    
Teacher Perceptions of Student Behavior
Teachers’ perceptions of specific minority student behaviors can also energize im-
plicit bias.  For example, Neal et al. (2003) found that students who displayed a 
Black walking style (i.e., “deliberately swaggered or bent posture, with the head 
slightly tilted to the side, one foot dragging, and an exaggerated knee bend”) were 
perceived by teachers as lower in academic achievement, highly aggressive, and more 
likely to be in need of special education services (Neal, McCray, Webb-Johnson, & 
Bridgest, 2003).  
Researchers also found that Whites with relatively high levels of implicit racial bias 
perceived Blacks to be more threatening than Whites.  In one study, Hugenberg and 
Bodenhausen (2003) explored whether implicit biases affected how subjects per-
ceived the facial emotions displayed by others.  The subjects were shown a series of 
faces (one series of Black and one series of White) that progressed from a scowl to a 
smile and asked what face in the series indicated an offset/onset of anger.  “Higher 
implicit … [bias] was associated with a greater readiness to perceive anger in Black 
faces, but neither explicit nor implicit prejudice predicted anger perceptions regard-
ing similar White faces” (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003, p. 640).  These findings 
suggest that White teachers may incorrectly perceive Black students as angry or ag-
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gressive, which could deter them from reaching out to assist these students or cause 
them to mislabel Black students as deviant.  
Teachers’ implicit biases may be further amplified by a cultural mismatch that exists 
between White teachers and their students of color, and this mismatch can lead 
to teachers misinterpreting student behavior (A. A. Ferguson, 2000).  For exam-
ple, Weinstein et al. (2004) recounts an anecdote wherein a European American 
teacher observed a lively debate occurring between African American males, and by 
interpreting the interaction as aggressive and contentious rather than simply verbal 
sparring common among African American teenagers, took the teens to the princi-
pal’s office for a reprimand (Weinstein, Tomlinson-Clarke, & Curran, 2004).  Often 
these cultural mismatch scenarios, with implicit biases fueled by negative portrayals 
of Black youth in the media, result in unnecessary and unequal disciplinary inter-
ventions for students of color.1   Similarly, in their book, The Cool Pose: The Dilemmas 
of Black Manhood in America, Majors and Mancini Billson explore how many Black 
males exhibit a distinct persona in an effort to assert their masculine identity.  They 
write, “Cool pose is a ritualized form of masculinity that entails behaviors, scripts, 
physical posturing, impression management, and carefully crafted performances that 
deliver a single, critical message: pride, strength, and control” (Majors & Billson, 
1992, p. 4).  Teachers who are not knowledgeable about Black cultural cues may 
misread this portrayal of masculinity as confrontational or defiant.
Students’ Self-Perceptions
Stereotypes can also emerge implicitly and affect students through a subtle mech-
anism known as stereotype threat.  Attributed to social psychologist Claude Steele, 
stereotype threat refers a fear of being viewed through the lens of a negative ste-
reotype, or the fear of inadvertently confirming an existing negative stereotype of 
a group with which one self-identifies (Steele & Aronson, 1995).  Studies have 
1. March 2012 data released by the U.S. Department of Education reported that Black students, boys in particular, 
face harsher discipline in public schools.  Black students were 3.5 times more likely to be suspended or expelled com-
pared to white students in the 2009-2010 school year.  (For more information, see Lewin, 2012.)
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shown that these fears often manifest themselves in lower performance by the ste-
reotyped group, even when the stereotyped group and non-stereotyped group being 
compared have been statistically matched in ability level (Steele & Aronson, 1995). 
For example, if a teacher tells students who are about to take a test that Asian stu-
dents generally score higher than Whites on this test, then Whites tend to perform 
significantly worse than if they had not been primed to think of themselves as less 
capable than Asians.  Moreover, stereotype threat has also been shown to impair 
test-taking efficiency, as individuals feeling stereotype threat complete fewer test 
problems and with a lower level of accuracy than those in a control group (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995).  In short, the fear of reinforcing a negative stereotype can implicitly 
provoke a “disruptive apprehension” that interferes with performance (R. F. Fergu-
son, 2003; Steele, 1997).
Culturally Appropriate Curriculum
Implicitly biased teachers may also unknowingly use curriculum that is not culturally 
responsive to all members of their classroom community.  This can be detrimental to 
students, as failing to modify curriculum in a manner that will facilitate the academ-
ic achievement of students from diverse racial, ethnic, and cultural groups creates an 
unequal pedagogy.  Banks writes about how teachers’ cultural competency and will-
ingness to develop their students’ cultural and linguistic strengths can increase aca-
demic achievement for students of color (Banks, 1995).  Teachers with high levels of 
implicit bias may fail to make these adjustments because, as noted previously, they 
may subconsciously view minority cultures and linguistic styles as a sign of low aca-
demic ability and aggression rather than simply distinct cultures and linguistic styles 
that differ from their own.  This not only reduces the academic potential of minority 
students but can also lead to the over-identification of students for special education 
and disciplinary action (for more information generally, see Arnold & Lassmann, 
2003; Sherwin & Schmidt, 2003; Skiba, Michael, Nardo, & Peterson, 2000).
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Implicit bias can surface in the criminal justice system in a variety of fashions, all 
of which may potentially taint the prospect of fair outcomes.  Before delving into 
the different facets of the system in which researchers have identified implicit bias 
in action, it is important to note that even small implicit biases can accumulate 
over the course of legal proceedings, thereby amplifying the effect.  In the words of 
Jerry Kang et al., “For a single defendant, these biases may surface for various deci-
sion makers repeatedly in policing, charging, bail, plea bargaining, pretrial motions, 
evidentiary motions, witness credibility, lawyer persuasiveness, guilt determination, 
sentencing recommendations, sentencing itself, appeal, and so on.  Even small biases 
at each stage may aggregate into a substantial effect”  (Kang, et al., 2012, p. 1151).
Outside the Courtroom
Bias in Police Officers
Like all other populations, police officers are not immune to implicit bias.  Eber-
hardt et al. studied police officers and found that when directly asked “who looks 
criminal?”, they chose Black faces over White ones, particularly those that were 
more stereotypically Black (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004).  Moreover, 
automatic implicit biases can cause officers to misinterpret Blacks’ behavior as sus-
picious or aggressive, even if the actions are neutral in nature (Richardson, 2011).
Graham and Lowery examined whether police officers’ unconscious racial stereo-
types affected how they perceive and treat juvenile offenders.  As predicted, the 
group of officers who were race-primed for the category Black judged the offenders 
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““
– Smith & Cohen, 2012, p. 233 –
Ultimately, the decision to sentence a person to death is based not on a rational 
determination, a weighing of the evidence, or the finding that the particular defendant 
is indeed guilty of the worst of the worst offenses, but rather on a series of unconscious 
decisions, by prosecutors, judges, jurors, and even defense lawyers in which race affects 
the processing of the underlying evidence and tilts the scales of justice.
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as more blameworthy and meriting harsher sanctions than the officers who were ex-
posed to a neutral prime, and consciously held beliefs about race were not found to 
moderate the effects of the racial primes (Graham & Lowery, 2004).  These findings 
have significant implications for juvenile offenders, as interactions with the criminal 
justice system at a youthful age can have lasting life effects.
On a more heartening note, while work by Plant and Peruche documented the ex-
istence of bias in police officers, they also concluded that racial biases are not inevi-
table and may be overcome (Plant & Peruche, 2005).  In another study, they found 
that police officers who have positive intergroup contact with Black people in their 
personal lives outside of the workplace held more positive attitudes towards Black 
people and more positive beliefs with respect to the criminality and violence of 
Black suspects (Peruche & Plant, 2006).  These findings foreshadow a larger discus-
sion on debiasing found in chapter 7 of this document.
Shooter / Weapons Bias
Shooter/weapons bias is a well-documented phenomenon.  Shooter bias refers to 
the strong and pervasive implicit association that exists between Blackness (as op-
posed to European Americans) and weapons (vs. harmless items).  Some studies in 
this realm rely on priming, such as B. Keith Payne’s work that showed that study 
participants identified guns more quickly than hand tools when primed with Black 
faces versus White faces, and they also misidentified tools as guns more frequently 
when a Black prime was employed (Payne, 2001).  These insights are helpful for be-
ginning to understand the shooter / weapons bias phenomenon.
One well-known study that examined implicit bias in this context was conducted by 
Joshua Correll and colleagues.  For this four-part study, the research team construct-
ed a videogame that allowed them to measure the effect of ethnicity on making the 
decision whether or not to shoot.  Simulating what police officers experience, par-
ticipants were instructed to “shoot” when armed individuals appeared on the screen 
and to “not shoot” unarmed targets.  Images that then flashed on the screen dis-
played African American and White individuals shown in front of complex back-
grounds, all of whom were holding some kind of object.  In some cases the objects 
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were guns; however, in others they were innocuous objects such as a camera, a can, a 
cell phone, or a wallet.  Participants were told to make the decision whether or not 
to shoot as quickly as possible.  Correll et al. hypothesized that stereotypes that as-
sociate African Americans with violence may provoke participants to “respond with 
greater speed and accuracy to stereotype-consistent targets (armed African Ameri-
cans and unarmed Whites) than to stereotype-inconsistent targets (armed Whites 
and unarmed African Americans)” (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002, p. 
1325).  The first study supported this hypothesis, as participants “shot” at armed 
individuals more quickly when they were African American as opposed to White, 
and made the decision to refrain from shooting unarmed targets more quickly when 
they were White as opposed to African Americans.  The second study required par-
ticipants to make “shoot or not” decisions within even shorter time constraints, and 
this led to the finding that when participants neglected to shoot an armed target, the 
individual on the screen tended to be White rather than African American.  And, 
in circumstances where the videogame character was displaying a harmless object, 
participants were more likely to mistakenly shoot African Americans versus Whites. 
Part three of the study considered the effects of prejudice and personal endorsement 
of the violent stereotype about African Americans; however, these did not predict 
shooter bias.  In short, it seems that the shooter bias observed was a byproduct of 
knowledge of the cultural stereotype rather than personal endorsement thereof.  In-
deed, in study four, researchers found that African American and White participants 
displayed similar levels of bias.  
Following up on this study five years later, Correll and colleagues compared actual 
police officers to community members to assess difference in the speed and accuracy 
of the “shoot or not” decisions described in their previous study.  They found that 
officers’ response times were quicker than civilians, and that officers made fewer mis-
takes differentiating armed from unarmed individuals (Correll, et al., 2007).  While 
all participants displayed some degree of racial bias, police officers displayed less bias 
in their final “to shoot or not” decisions (Correll, et al., 2007).  
It is important to emphasize, however, that weapons bias is generally regarded as 
occurring independent of intent, meaning that even someone who is consciously 
and explicitly committed to being fair and unbiased may display this bias anyways 
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(Kang, et al., 2012; Payne, 2006).  Shooter bias is largely driven by stereotypical as-
sociations rather than blatant racial hostility (Payne, 2006). “In the policing context, 
implicit stereotypes can cause an officer who harbors no conscious racial animosity 
and who rejects using race as a proxy for criminality to unintentionally treat indi-
viduals differently based solely upon their physical appearance”(Richardson, 2011, 
p. 2039).
The measurement of schema consistent and inconsistent pairings, such as on the 
IAT, is significant to note here, as police officers may only have fractions of a second 
in which to decide whether to shoot (Kang, et al., 2012; Payne, 2006).  Thus, the 
implications of this bias can be literally mean life or death (Kang, et al., 2012; Plant 
& Peruche, 2005; Plant, Peruche, & Butz, 2005).
Within the Courtroom
Numerous dynamics and actors within the courtroom can activate or fall susceptible 
to implicit biases.
Judges
Even with an avowed commitment to impartiality, judges, like the rest of the general 
population, display implicit biases.  In one study, researchers administered the race 
IAT to both Black and White judges.  White judges displayed a strong White pref-
erence, as this implicit bias was revealed in 87.1% of the 85 White judges studied 
(Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich, & Guthrie, 2009).  In contrast, Black judges gener-
ally displayed a no clear preference (Rachlinski, et al., 2009). 
While many variables may factor into this finding, one common theme in the liter-
ature is the “illusion of objectivity,” which contributes to judges feeling overly confi-
dent in their ability to remain unbiased.  Rachlinski et al. asked a group of judges to 
rank their own ability to “avoid racial prejudice in decision-making,” and a stunning 
97% of them placed themselves in the top half, with 50% ranking themselves in the 
top quartile (Rachlinski, et al., 2009, p. 1125).  These unusually high percentages, 
that are mathematical impossibilities, were not isolated to just one study.  Anoth-
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er study asked administrative law judges about their capacity for avoiding bias in 
judging, and the numbers were extraordinarily similar.  Over 97% of the judges in 
this study placed themselves in the top half, with 50% ranking their ability to avoid 
biased judging within the top quartile (Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2009). 
Other related studies have noted how “blind spot bias” causes people to see biases 
in other people more clearly than in themselves (Pronin, 2006; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 
2002).  These findings highlight the extent to which the illusion of objectivity can 
affect how judges perceive themselves and their decision making.      
 
The illusion of objectivity not only affects judges’ self-perception, it also colors their 
judgment.  An experiment by Ulhmann and Cohen found that “when people feel 
that they are objective, rational actors, they act on their group-based biases more 
rather than less” (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007, p. 221).  Susceptible to the illusion of 
objectivity, judges may unintentionally act in ways that align with the implicit biases 
they hold.  The irony that thinking of oneself as objective actually fosters more bi-
ased decisions should be a tremendous concern to judges everywhere.  In the concise 
words of Kang et al., “believing oneself to be objective is a prime threat to objectiv-
ity” (Kang, et al., 2012, p. 1184).
Jurors
Generally speaking, research has indicated that jurors tend to show biases against 
defendants of a different race (Kang, et al., 2012).  One meta-analysis of laboratory 
studies by Mitchell et al. found this ingroup bias affected both verdicts and sentenc-
ing, albeit with relatively small effect sizes (T. L. Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 
2005).
An empirical study by Levinson and Young explored how mock-jurors assess trial 
evidence.  Introducing their Biased Evidence Hypothesis, the researchers built upon 
the literature on priming by asserting that the activation of racial stereotypes prompt 
jurors to “automatically and unintentionally evaluate ambiguous trial evidence in 
racially biased ways” (Levinson & Young, 2010, p. 309).  Research participants were 
shown a slideshow of evidence from a fictitious armed robbery in which half of 
the participants viewed a dark-skinned perpetuator and the other half saw a light-
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er-skinned perpetuator.  Supporting the Biased Evidence Hypothesis, the results 
showed that, compared to the White-skinned perpetuator, participants who viewed 
the darker skinned perpetuator were more likely to consider the evidence as indica-
tive of criminal guilt and more likely to assert that the defendant was in fact guilty 
of committing the armed robbery (Levinson & Young, 2010).  
An empirical study by Levinson examined whether implicit racial bias affected how 
mock jurors recalled legal facts from fictional story involving a fistfight.  While the 
story itself remained consistent throughout the study, in one condition, participants 
read about “William,” who was specifically noted to be Caucasian.  Other partici-
pants experienced alternate conditions in which William was replaced by Tyronne 
(who was explicitly listed as African American) or Kawika, a Hawaiian.  After a 
fifteen-minute distraction task, participants were asked to recall details of the con-
frontation scenario.  Levinson found that the reported race of the fictional defen-
dant affected participants’ recall of the story.  Notably, participants were significantly 
more likely to remember facts about the aggressiveness of Tyronne compared to 
when William or Kawika were substituted in the same role (Levinson, 2007).  This 
finding of racially biased memories did not relate to participants’ explicit racial pref-
erences (Levinson, 2007).  Levinson notes how this misremembering of facts due to 
implicit racial biases can have crucial consequences for the enactment of justice in a 
legal setting.  
Further work by Levinson and his colleagues Cai and Young examined whether im-
plicit biases affect jury decisions in ways that reflect racial bias.  The researchers de-
buted a new IAT, the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT, which measures the implicit associa-
tion between African Americans and criminal guilt (Levinson, Cai, & Young, 2010). 
Their study tested whether the Guilty/Not Guilty IAT predicted how mock jurors 
responded to unclear trial evidence and found a connection between the implicit 
associations they measured and jurors’ views of the evidence (Levinson, et al., 2010, 
p. 190).  Studies such as this reiterate the role of implicit bias in jury deliberations 
and introduce skepticism to the ideal of “innocent until proven guilty.”
One very important nuance to this juror bias research must be highlighted:  contrary 
to what may be the prevailing assumption, when a case is “racially charged,” jurors 
show less bias because they are more thoughtful about the role of race than they are 
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when race is not an explicit aspect of the case (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; Som-
mers & Ellsworth, 2001). 
The racial composition of a jury also has a considerable impact on legal decisions 
(Arterton, 2008; Bowers, Sandys, & Brewer, 2004; Sommers, 2006).  Sommers stud-
ied the group decision making processes and outcomes of mock juries of various 
racial compositions and found that compared to an all-White jury, diverse juries 
deliberated longer and discussed a wider range of information from the case (Som-
mers, 2006).  Bowers looked at the jury racial composition data from 74 capital trials 
and concluded that juries dominated by White males was strongly associated with 
death penalty sentencing decisions (Bowers, et al., 2004).  Supreme court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Georgia v. McCollum affirms this notion that 
jurors, their implicit racial biases, and jury composition shape trial proceedings:  “[i]
t is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way White 
jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps 
determining the verdict of guilt or innocence .... [M]inority representation on the 
jury may help to overcome such racial bias, for there is substantial reason to believe 
that the distorting influence of race is minimized on a racially mixed jury” (“Georgia 
v. McCollum,” 1992, p. 68).
Together these studies show that the likelihood of a jury convicting a defendant 
involves not only the strength of the case and the credibility of its evidence, but also 
the everyday prejudices and implicit biases the jurors bring to the deliberations.  
Sentencing
Given the courtroom dynamics discussed thus far, it is not surprising that implicit 
racial biases may taint the sentencing process.  Considering that sentences often 
have profound and life-altering effects on the convicted, researchers have investi-
gated and attempted to measure the effects of these biases.  The results are startling.
Adding to research that found that people hold associations between stereotypi-
cally Black physical traits and perceived criminality (Eberhardt, et al., 2004), Blair, 
Judd, and Chapleau explored the connection between criminal sentencing and Af-
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rocentric features bias.  This form of bias refers to the generally negative judgments 
and beliefs that many people hold regarding individuals who possess particularly 
Afrocentric features, notably dark skin, a wide nose, and full lips.  The presence 
of these features may activate associations that lead to stereotypical perceptions. 
Blair et al. studied young Black and White male inmates in the Florida Department 
of Corrections database and found that Black and White inmates with equivalent 
criminal records tended to receive similar sentences; however, within each race, in-
dividuals with more Afrocentric features received longer sentences than those with 
less Afrocentric features (Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004).  More specifically, being 
one standard deviation above the mean level of Afrocentric features for a given 
group equated to sentences that were seven to eight months longer than individu-
als one standard deviation below the group mean, even when criminal records are 
held constant (Blair, et al., 2004).  Thus, the mere perception of an offender having 
more Afrocentric features, even if the offender is White, activates an implicit bias 
that leads to longer sentences.  Pizzi, Blair, and Judd posited an explanation for this 
phenomenon, asserting, “it is our thesis that judges have learned to be more careful 
to impose similar sentences between racial groups, but they have not been similarly 
sensitized to the possibility of discrimination based on Afrocentric features within 
racial categories” (Pizzi, Blair, & Judd, 2005, p. 331).
Applying this concept to death penalty sentences, Eberhardt and colleagues studied 
whether the extent to which Black defendants possess stereotypically Black physical 
traits affects their likelihood of being sentenced to the death penalty in death-eli-
gible cases.  Using data from death-eligible cases from 1979-1999 in Philadelphia, 
researchers found that after controlling for numerous factors, when the victim was 
White, Black defendants whose appearance was more stereotypically Black were 
more likely to be sentenced to death than those whose faces displayed fewer ste-
reotypically Black traits (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006).  In 
cases where the victim was Black, however, the perceived stereotypicality of Black 
defendants did not predict death sentencing.
Prosecutors
Prosecutors are as susceptible to implicit racial biases as anyone else, and the unique 
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nature of their job provides numerous opportunities for those biases to act within 
criminal justice proceedings.  
A recent law review article by Smith and Levinson outlines three main areas in 
which prosecutors may unknowingly act upon their implicit racial biases: when 
making charging decisions, during pretrial strategy, and throughout trial strategy 
(Smith & Levinson, 2012).  With respect to charging decisions, implicit biases color 
how offenders are perceived, thereby affecting whether a suspect should be charged, 
and if so, what severity of a crime should be charged.  These choices can have tre-
mendous impacts on suspects’ lives, particularly when prosecutors are deciding be-
tween trying someone in juvenile court vs. adult court, or determining whether to 
pursue the death penalty.  
Then, as part of pretrial strategy, prosecutors are faced with making bail determina-
tions.  Smith and Levinson note that the assumption that suspects who have good 
jobs and connections in the community are generally regarded as less likely to flee; 
however, the stereotypes that plague African Americans as being lazier and less 
trustworthy may activate implicit biases that cause prosecutors to view their employ-
ment records with a greater degree of skepticism (Smith & Levinson, 2012).  Also 
part of pretrial strategy are decisions related to whether to offer a plea bargain, and 
if so, what the reduced charge would be.  Smith and Levinson state that implicit 
stereotypes can affect this process, as some people may be regarded more leniently 
as “troubled, but not a bad person,” which increases the likelihood of being offered 
a plea bargain compared to an individual of a different race who may be deemed 
unlawful or dangerous (Smith & Levinson, 2012, p. 817-818). 
Finally, prosecutorial implicit biases can crop up during aspects of trial strategy, such 
as jury selection and closing arguments.  During closing arguments, in particular, 
prosecutors may activate implicit biases by referring to the accused in terms that 
dehumanize them, such as using animal imagery.  Upon accounting for empirical 
studies that showed how many people still mentally connect Black people with apes 
(Goff, et al., 2008), the use of animal imagery is all the more alarming.  Goff and 
colleagues found that as the number of ape references made about a Black defen-
dant increased, so too did the likelihood of that defendant being sentenced to death 
www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu45
(Goff, et al., 2008).  Thus, the language used by prosecutors can trigger implicit bi-
ases that dramatically affect trial outcomes.
Defense Attorneys
As with all of the other legal actors discussed so far, defense attorneys are not exempt 
from harboring implicit racial biases (Eisenberg & Johnson, 2004).  Lyon recently 
identified two main areas where defense attorneys’ implicit biases can affect the 
judicial process: within the attorney-client relationship, and during the jury selec-
tion process (Lyon, 2012).  She writes about how implicit biases can influence how 
attorneys perceive their clients, such as seeing an “angry Black man” rather than a 
Black man who became frustrated when unable to understand the choices and con-
sequences his attorney was outlining.  Lyons also mentions how defense lawyers can 
fall into the trap of relying on humor to defuse stress; however, there is a need for 
caution in doing this so that the client is not dehumanized in the process.  
With respect to voir dire and jury selection, defense attorneys must caution against 
relying on stereotypes to make assumptions about how a prospective juror may re-
spond to the attorney’s client and associated case.  Lyons asserts that using stereo-
types in juror selection may extend to implicit biases later in the judicial process. 
She warns, “If we are using this process of elimination based on stereotypes, jurors 
will know it.  And then we cannot get angry if the jurors return the favor by making 
the assumption that our young male minority client is guilty, a gang member, or 
otherwise dangerous and not deserving of respect” (Lyon, 2012, p. 767). 
Implicit Bias in Criminal Justice
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The presence and prevalence of racial disparities in health and health care across a 
wide array of ailments have been documented extensively (for example overviews, 
see Elster, Jarosik, VanGeest, & Fleming, 2003; Mead, et al., 2008; Smedley, Stith, & 
Nelson, 2003; Stevens & Shi, 2003).  Various explanations for these disparities range 
from individuals’ lifestyle decisions, biomedical reasons, and social/environmental 
factors.  The Kirwan Institute emphasizes this third category, noting that the social 
determinants of health such as where people are born, live, and work all affect health 
outcomes (for further information, see Daniels, Kennedy, & Kawachi, 1999; Social 
Determinants of Health,” 2012; World Health Organization, 2008).  
As discussed in this chapter, studies have documented the presence of implicit bias 
in a variety of facets of the health / healthcare industry. 
Physicians’ Implicit Biases
Like all other groups of people, health care professionals carry implicit biases that 
can influence their behaviors and judgments (Stone & Moskowitz, 2011).  Some 
researchers have examined what role, if any, physicians’ implicit racial biases play in 
the formation and perpetuation of these disparities.  For example, Sabin and col-
leagues measured the implicit and explicit racial biases of 2,535 medical doctors and 
accounted for the physicians’ own race and gender in their analysis.  This research 
yielded three notable conclusions:  1) the doctors’ implicit and explicit attitudes 
about race align well with the patterns found in large heterogeneous samples of 
the general population, as most doctors implicitly preferred Whites to Blacks; 2) 
on average, African American doctors did not display any implicit racial preferenc-
es for Whites or Blacks; 3) physician gender matters, as female doctors tended to 
hold fewer implicit racial biases (Sabin, et al., 2009).  Other researchers have exam-
ined this phenomenon at an earlier stage, finding an implicit preference for Whites 
among first-year medical students (Haider, et al., 2011).
Furthering this line of inquiry, Moskowitz et al. conducted two studies aimed at 
exploring whether unconscious stereotypes influence the thoughts and behaviors of 
physicians.  They identified the stereotypical maladies that medical professionals as-
sociated with African American patients and, by utilizing a reaction time procedure 
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in which subject received implicit primes, found that doctors implicitly associated 
certain diseases with African Americans (Moskowitz, Stone, & Childs, 2012).  The 
authors articulate two main dangers of this implicit stereotyping: “(1) inaccurate 
components of a stereotype may be used in diagnosis and treatment without con-
scious knowledge of this influence, [and] (2) even an accurate stereotype may unduly 
influence diagnosis and treatment” (Moskowitz, et al., 2012, p. 1000).  
Finally, in the realm of psychotherapy, Abreu used an experimental design to de-
termine that therapists who were unknowingly primed with terms and stereotypes 
about a fictional patient rated the patient more negatively than a control group who 
were primed with neutral words (Abreu, 1999).  This is yet another example of how 
the biases medical professionals carry can affect their patients.  
Differential Treatment
Alarmingly, implicit biases have been shown to affect the type(s) and quality of care 
that patients of various races receive.
Schulman et al. examined racial variations in medical treatment using videos of 
actors portraying patients reporting chest pain.  The patients were similar across 
several characteristics (e.g., socioeconomic status, type of insurance plan); however, 
they varied by race and sex.  Results indicated that women and Blacks were less like-
ly to be referred for cardiac catherization compared to their respective sex and race 
counterparts (Schulman, et al., 1999).  Further analyses indicated that patients’ race 
and sex independently influenced the doctors’ recommendations, which provides 
insights into the differential treatment of cardiovascular disease (Schulman, et al., 
1999).  
A similar study by Weisse and colleagues explored whether the race and gender of 
patients influence doctors’ decisions for treating patients who are reporting pain due 
to a kidney stone or back problems.  Researchers presented doctors with vignettes 
depicting patients with these ailments.  While patient race and gender varied across 
vignettes, the description and severity of his/her symptoms remained consistent 
across all cases.  Researchers did not find any differences by race or gender with 
respect to the doctors’ decision to administer treatment; however, they found that 
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treatments prescribed varied by patients’ race and gender.  With respect to race, male 
physicians prescribed higher doses of pain medication to White patients compared 
to Black patients, yet female doctors gave higher doses to Blacks (Weisse, Sorum, 
Sanders, & Syat, 2001).   In terms of gender, male physicians prescribed higher doses 
of pain medicine to men, and female doctors gave higher doses of pain medication 
to female patients compared to males (Weisse, et al., 2001).  These findings suggest 
that acknowledging a physicians’ gender is key to understanding differential treat-
ment of patients by race and gender (Weisse, et al., 2001).
The first study to provide compelling evidence of implicit bias among physicians 
using the IAT was conducted by Green et al.  They sought to determine wheth-
er physicians held implicit racial biases, and if so, did the amount of implicit bias 
predict whether the doctors would prescribe thombolysis for Black and White pa-
tients displaying acute coronary symptoms.  In terms of the results, the physicians 
reported not having any explicit preferences for Black or White patients; however, 
implicit measures recorded a preference for White patients and a belief that Black 
patients were less likely to cooperate with medical procedures (Green, et al., 2007). 
Most notably, the researchers found that increases in physicians’ pro-White biases 
coincided with an increased likelihood of treating White patients with thrombolysis 
but not Black patients (Green, et al., 2007).  Thus, the dissociation of implicit and 
explicit biases in a medical context can lead to differential treatment by race, which 
has obvious and important implications for patients’ well-being.   
Taking the study by Green et al., 2007 to a different context, Sabin and Greenwald 
used three different IAT tests to examine pediatricians’ implicit attitudes and how 
they affect treatment recommendations for four pediatric conditions (pain, urinary 
tract infection, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and asthma).  While there 
were not any significant associations between implicit attitudes and three of the di-
agnoses, researchers did uncover an association between unconscious biases related 
to patient race and prescribing narcotics for surgery-related pain (Sabin & Green-
wald, 2012).  Specifically, as pediatricians’ pro-White implicit bias increased, so too 
did their inclination to prescribe pain-killing narcotics for White rather than Black 
patients (Sabin & Greenwald, 2012).  Thus, implicit biases have been shown to in-
fluence patient treatment decisions even for youths. 
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Doctor - Patient Interactions
Another area affected by implicit bias in the healthcare realm is doctor-patient com-
munication.  Indeed, a study by Penner et al. concluded that White physicians’ im-
plicit racial biases led to less positive interactions with Black patients, particularly 
for doctors who displayed the combination of low explicit bias but high implicit bias 
(Penner, et al., 2010).  Relatedly, a sample of physicians in another study found that 
“physicians were 23% more verbally dominant and engaged in 33% less patient-cen-
tered communication with African American patients than with White patients” 
( Johnson, Roter, Powe, & Cooper, 2004, p. 2084).
Looking at primary care clinicians, Cooper et al. examined how the implicit at-
titudes of primary care clinicians related to clinician-patient communication and 
patient ratings of care.  Using an IAT that measured clinicians’ race bias, the re-
searchers found that higher implicit race bias scores generally were associated with 
more verbal dominance and lower patient positive affect for Black patients (Cooper, 
et al., 2012).  From the perspective of Black patients, clinicians with higher IAT race 
bias were linked to Black patients feeling like they received less respect from the 
clinician, having less confidence in the clinician, and being less likely to recommend 
the clinician to other people (Cooper, et al., 2012).  Conversely, White patients who 
interacted with clinicians who held higher levels of race bias felt that they were re-
spected and liked (Cooper, et al., 2012).  
Fostering Cultural Competency
Stone and Moskowitz define cultural competency in a medical environment as “the 
ability of systems to provide care to patients with diverse values, beliefs and behav-
iors, including their tailoring of delivery to meet patients’ social, cultural and linguis-
tic needs” (Stone & Moskowitz, 2011, p. 771).  Contributing to the perpetuation of 
implicit biases in health care is the fact that medical professionals are not necessarily 
formally trained or well-versed in cultural competency (Carillo, Green, & Betan-
court, 1999; White III, 2011).
Begun in 1997 and formally published in 2001, the Office of Minority Health in the 
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U.S. Department of Health and Human Services created the National Standards for 
Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services in Health Care (National Stan-
dards for Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services in Health Care, 2001). 
These standards “respond to the need to ensure that all people entering the health 
care system receive equitable and effective treatment in a culturally  and linguis-
tically appropriate manner”(National Standards for Culturally and Linguistically 
Appropriate Services in Health Care, 2001, p. 3).  Stone and Moskowitz, however, 
point out that while these standards are a step in the right direction, they leave the 
way in which this material should be taught open to interpretation, thus medical 
professionals are left to “walk the thin line between the activation of cultural knowl-
edge and the use of stereotypes” (Stone & Moskowitz, 2011, p. 772).
Several scholars have called for more cross-cultural/cultural competency curricula 
to educate medical professionals (Geiger, 2001; Stone & Moskowitz, 2011; White 
III, 2011).  While these materials and teachings can be an important steps toward 
dismantling implicit biases, scholars also warn against stereotyping or oversimplify-
ing a culture, as assuming that members of a given racial or ethnic group behave in 
a uniform and predicable manner is also problematic (Betancourt, 2004; Carillo, et 
al., 1999).
Concluding Thoughts
The impact of implicit biases in healthcare should not be understated.  Moskow-
itz and colleagues capture the far-reaching effects, writing that implicit stereotypes 
can unintentionally affect medical professionals’ “diagnoses, treatment recommen-
dations, expectations about whether a patient will follow a prescribed treatment, and 
both verbal and nonverbal behavior toward patients during professional interactions, 
despite their intention to avoid such biases in conduct” (Moskowitz, et al., 2012). 
Anderson takes these concerns a step further by asserting that, “Of the four princi-
ples of bioethics, three—autonomy, non-maleficence, and justice—are most directly 
impacted by implicit bias”(Anderson, 2012).  He stresses the need for medical pro-
viders “to increase the depth of their own understanding and to identify and utilize 
readily available resources to decrease both the occurrence and impact of implicit 
bias” (Anderson, 2012).
Implicit Bias in Health/Health Care
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While implicit biases are deeply entrenched in the subconscious, researchers gener-
ally agree that biases are malleable and that implicit associations may be unlearned 
(see, e.g., Blair, 2002; Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; 
Devine, 1989; Kang, 2009; Kang & Lane, 2010).  As discussed in this chapter, the 
debiasing process can take many different forms and yield varying results depending 
on factors such as individual motivation and context, as these influence what associ-
ations are brought to the foreground of one’s mind (Foroni & Mayr, 2005). 
Debiasing is far from a simple task, as it involves the construction of new mental 
associations.  Devine writes, “Inhibiting stereotype-congruent or prejudice-like re-
sponses and intentionally replacing them with non-prejudiced response can be lik-
ened to the breaking of a bad habit” (Devine, 1989, p. 15).  She adds how “intention, 
attention, and time” are needed so that new responses are learned well enough to 
compete with the formerly automatically activated responses (Devine, 1989, p. 16). 
Given how strongly rooted implicit biases tend to be, debiasing efforts have to com-
pete against stimuli that can, in effect, “re-bias” (Kang, et al., 2012, p. 1170).  
The first inclination for many people who realize they hold implicit racial/ethnic 
biases may be to attempt to debias by repressing these biased thoughts; however, 
this notion generally has not been supported by the literature due to “rebound ef-
fects.”  Suppressing automatic stereotypes does not reduce them and may even am-
plify them by making them hyper-accessible (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000, 2007; 
Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994).  Studies have shown that “instead 
of repressing one’s prejudices, if one openly acknowledges one’s biases, and direct-
ly challenges or refutes them, one can overcome them”(bstan-’dzin-rgya-mtsho & 
Cuttler, 2009, p. 70).  Similarly, Blair and Banaji found that conscious efforts to 
counter stereotypes can inhibit the activation of automatic associations (Blair & 
Banaji, 1996).  
Debiasing
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Numerous researchers have used the IAT to demonstrate the malleability of implicit 
attitudes.  For example, Kawakami and colleagues found that proximity, as exam-
ined through approach-avoidance orientations, affected implicit racial bias scores 
across a series of four studies (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007).  Ito and 
colleagues published another example of the IAT documenting the malleability of 
implicit racial attitudes that they achieved by manipulating participants’ emotional 
cues.  Some participants were surreptitiously induced to smile by holding a pencil 
in their mouths while viewing photos of unfamiliar Black or White men; others 
were not instructed to perform any such somatic manipulation.  IAT results showed 
that this manipulation influenced IAT outcomes, as individuals who surreptitiously 
smiled while viewing Black faces earlier displayed less racial bias against Blacks (Ito, 
Chiao, Devine, Lorig, & Cacioppo, 2006).  Richeson and Ambady considered the 
role of situational power (i.e., whether one is regarded as superior or subordinate in 
an interracial dyad) was reflected by changes in implicit racial attitudes in interracial 
interactions but not in same-race interactions (Richeson & Ambady, 2003).  These 
studies, among others, declare implicit biases to be malleable.
With this in mind, it is logical that subsequent attention has been devoted to using 
this malleability property to counter existing biases.  The following sections examine 
various debiasing techniques.
 
Interventions that may debias successfully
Counter-stereotypic training
A significant portion of the debiasing research centers on interventions that counter 
stereotypes and train individuals to develop new associations.  One such example, 
advanced by Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (2001) focused on how modifying the 
situational context may influence racial attitudes.  By juxtaposing ordinary people in 
counter-stereotypic situations, such as depicting young White and Black males in 
scenes that included a church and a graffiti-strewn street corner, researchers found 
that the context condition affected participants’ racial attitudes on a subsequent se-
quential priming task (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001).  The data from this count-
er-stereotypic training indicated that social category clues may affect individuals’ 
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automatic responses and racial attitudes.
Taking the notion of countering stereotypes rather literally, Kawakami et al., 2000 
studied the effects of training people to negate stereotypic associations, including ra-
cial associations.  By instructing participants to verbally respond “no” when present-
ed with a stereotypic trait that matched a category representation and “yes” when 
viewing non-stereotypic associations, they found that participants who received this 
stereotype negation training displayed diminished stereotype activation (Kawakami, 
et al., 2000).  
Notably, this effect remained salient 24 hours after the training ended (Kawakami, 
et al., 2000).  These findings emphasize the importance of not just counter-ste-
reotypic instruction, but also the need for consistent repetition of this instruction. 
Kawakami and colleagues later extended this work to examine the effect of training 
on non-stereotypic traits of men and women in the context of hiring decisions and 
found similar results supporting the effectiveness of counter-stereotypic training 
(see Kawakami, Dovidio, & Kamp, 2005).
Finally, Blair and colleagues researched the strategy of using mental imagery as a 
way to moderate implicit stereotypes.  Over the course of five experiments that used 
mental imagery to target gender stereotypes, they found compelling evidence that 
counter-stereotypical mental imagery yielded notably weaker implicit stereotypes 
as compared to the implicit stereotypes assessed in individuals who either engaged 
in other forms of mental imagining or no mental imagery whatsoever (Blair, et al., 
2001).
Rather than only mental, imagery in other forms may be used to debias.  For court-
room settings, Kang and colleagues suggest the use of posters, pamphlets, photo-
graphs, and similar materials that would provoke counter-typical associations in the 
minds of jurors and judges (Kang, et al., 2012).  The effects of this would likely vary 
based on the amount of exposure, with the underlying intention that even momen-
tarily activating a different association may help decrease the presence of implicit 
bias during legal processes.
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Exposure to counter-stereotypic individuals
Another type of intervention focuses on exposing people to individuals who con-
tradict widely-held stereotypes.  One fascinating study by Dasgupta and Greenwald 
(2001) investigated whether exposure to counter-stereotypic exemplars could de-
crease automatic preferences, such as that for White over Black Americans.  They 
found that exposure to pro-Black exemplars (e.g., Michael Jordan, Colin Powell, 
Martin Luther King, Jr.) as opposed to nonracial or pro-White exemplars (e.g., Tom 
Hanks, Jay Leno, John F. Kennedy) significantly decreased the automatic White 
preference effect, as measured by the IAT (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001).  Similar 
to the findings of Kawakami et al., 2000, this effect had staying power, as the IAT 
effect of this pro-Black condition remained 24 hours after the exposure to images 
of admired Blacks and disliked Whites (e.g., Jeffrey Dahmer, Timothy McVeigh, 
Al Capone).  Emphasizing the malleability of implicit biases, the authors suggest 
that “creating environments that highlight admired and disliked members of various 
groups … may, over time, render these exemplars chronically accessible so that they 
can consistently and automatically override preexisting biases”(Dasgupta & Green-
wald, 2001, p. 807).
This scholarship aligns well with the concept of debiasing agents, which refers to 
individuals whose traits contrast with the stereotypes typically associated with that 
particular category (Kang & Banaji, 2006).  The presence of debiasing agents de-
creases the implicit biases of those they encounter due to their unique positioning. 
Example debiasing agents would include male nurses, elderly athletes, and female 
scientists.  In many cases, debiasing agents change individuals’ implicit stereotypes, 
not just their implicit attitudes (Kang & Banaji, 2006).  However, to be effective, 
debiasing agents must be viewed as not merely an exception bur rather connect that 
individual to relevant categories, regardless of any counter-stereotypical traits they 
may also possess (Kang & Banaji, 2006).     
  
The success of the exposure to counter-stereotypic individuals intervention has been 
echoed by other studies that do not focus explicitly on race.  For example, one study 
found that exposure to women in leadership positions at a women’s college led to 
students being less likely to express automatic gender stereotypes about women, 
www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu57
compared to students from a coeducational college (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004).
Moreover, exposure to counter-stereotypic exemplars does not even need to occur 
through in-person interactions.  Renowned implicit bias scholar Mahzarin Banaji 
works to offset her own implicit biases through viewing images of counter-stereo-
typical individuals on her computer screensaver (Lehrman, 2006).  Photos and other 
wall décor can serve a similar purpose (Kang, et al., 2012; National Center for State 
Courts).
However, some researchers question this counter-stereotypic exemplar debiasing 
method.  First, an extensive 2010 study by Schmidt and Nosek examined whether 
Barack Obama, as a high-status famous Black exemplar shifted implicit or explic-
it racial attitudes during his candidacy and early presidency.  Results from a het-
erogeneous sample of nearly 480,000 individuals led to the conclusion that there 
was minimal evidence that implicit racial attitudes changed systematically due to 
Obama’s presence as a counter-stereotypic exemplar (Schmidt & Nosek, 2010).  
The authors suggest that the mere presence of a high-status counter-stereotypic 
exemplar may be inadequate to shift implicit or explicit racial attitudes (Schmidt & 
Nosek, 2010).  Building on this work, Lybarger and Monteith’s research concluded 
that President Obama’s saliency alone did not have a debiasing effect, as one individ-
ual may be inadequate to shift long-standing implicit racial associations (Lybarger 
& Monteith, 2011).
Second, Joy-Gaba and Nosek provide a word of caution regarding the perceived 
malleability of implicit biases through exposure to counter-stereotypic exemplars. 
Their efforts to replicate and expand upon the work of Dasgupta and Greenwald 
(2001) noted earlier in this subsection yielded conspicuously less convincing re-
sults.  Notably, while the degree of malleability found by Dasgupta and Greenwald 
was quite high on both the initial measure (d = 0.82) and follow-up 24 hours later 
(d = 0.71), Joy-Gaba and Nosek found significantly weaker effect magnitudes (d = 
0.17 and 0.14, respectively) ( Joy-Gaba & Nosek, 2010).  This discrepancy leads the 
authors to broadly conclude that the extent to which the literature declares implicit 
biases to be malleable may have been overstated ( Joy-Gaba & Nosek, 2010).  
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Intergroup Contact 
Championed by American psychologist Gordon W. Allport in 1954, intergroup 
contact theory asserts that four key conditions are the necessary for positive effects 
to emerge from intergroup contact (Allport, 1954).  Allport stipulated that optimal 
intergroup contact involves individuals of equal status, which explains why some re-
lationships, such as that of student and teacher, do not necessarily lead to reductions 
in bias.  Other conditions that yield positive intergroup contact effects include shar-
ing common goals, interacting in a cooperative rather than competitive setting, and 
being supported by authority figures, laws, or customs.  Allport’s theory has been 
supported consistently in the literature, including through large-scale meta-analyses 
(see, e.g.,Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2011). 
Beyond simply gaining familiarity with outgroups through intergroup contact, these 
interactions have been shown to reduce implicit bias.  For example, Thomas Petti-
grew’s multi-national study found that “the reduction in prejudice among those with 
diverse friends generalizes to more positive feelings about a wide variety of out-
groups” (Pettigrew, 1997, p. 180-181).  Moreover, ten years later in a meta-analytic 
test of intergroup contact theory, Pettigrew and Tropp examined 713 samples and 
concluded that ingroup contact generally reduces intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006).
With respect to the realms of criminal justice and health care previously discussed, 
intergroup contact can play a debiasing role in specific contexts.  Peruche and Plant 
studied police officers and noted that “high levels of negative contact with Black 
people at work were related to negative expectations regarding Black suspects and 
marginally more negative attitudes toward Black people generally;” however, inter-
group contact with Blacks outside of the workplace countered these effects (Peruche 
& Plant, 2006, p. 197).  Similarly, diverse clinical care teams are vital to health care, 
because in a diverse team where members are granted equal power, “a sense of cama-
raderie develops that prevents the further development of stereotypes based on race/
ethnicity, gender, culture or class” (Betancourt, 2004, p. 108).
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Education about Implicit Bias
Efforts aimed at raising awareness of the phenomenon of implicit bias can also 
debias.  This education can take several forms.  For example, U.S. district judge 
Mark W. Bennett educates potential jurors about implicit bias during his time with 
them during the juror selection process.  Judge Bennett aims to explain implicit 
bias and make jurors skeptical of their own objectivity through a 25-minute lesson 
that concludes by asking each juror to sign a pledge against bias.  The text of this 
pledge is prominently displayed in the jury room.  Then, at the beginning of the 
trial, Judge Bennett reiterates how implicit bias can taint jurors’ judgment by giving 
a short speech2  before the lawyers’ opening statements.  He believes in the positive 
outcomes studies have documented regarding individuals’ responses to awareness of 
their own implicit biases (Bennett, 2010).
A recent article by Anna Roberts strongly supports the idea of using the IAT to 
educate jurors about implicit bias while dismissing the notion that the IAT should 
be used to “screen” prospective jurors (Roberts, 2012).  Much like Judge Mark Ben-
nett, Roberts recommends that this educational component be integrated into ju-
ror orientation, preferably with jurors receiving hands-on experiential learning that 
includes taking the IAT, as this is more impactful than passively learning about the 
IAT and its findings (Roberts, 2012).
Judges can also benefit from implicit bias education, which in large part involves 
persuading them of the presence of this problem (Kang, et al., 2012; Saujani, 2003). 
Organizations such as the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) have begun 
creating resources3, such as films and assessments, designed to raise judicial aware-
ness of implicit biases and their implications in a courtroom setting.  Results from 
pilot sites showed promising preliminary results (Kang, et al., 2012).  Research sug-
gests that educating judges about implicit bias is most effective under three circum-
stances:  1) training should start early, such as during new judge orientation when 
2. See Appendix A for the text of this brief speech.
3. The National Center for State Courts have posted some of their educational films and materials here: http://
www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/ref/implicit.html
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people are most open to new ideas; 2) the training should be presented in such a way 
that judges do not feel defensive; it should not be accusatory in nature;  and 3) judges 
should be encouraged to take the IAT, as the results often prompt action (Kang, et 
al., 2012).
An entire industry around diversity education and trainings has proliferated in re-
cent years, offering participants promises of reduced prejudice and greater appreci-
ation of various cultures.  Studies have examined whether diversity education can 
counter implicit biases, though the results are mixed.  One study found that Whites 
who volunteered for diversity education forums showed lower levels of implicit and 
explicit anti-Black prejudice, with the change in implicit orientations “predicted by 
emotion-based factors, including reduced fear of Blacks, and liking for the Black 
professor who taught the course” (Rudman, 2004, p. 136; Rudman, Ashmore, & 
Gary, 2001).  Conversely, other research finds diversity training yield minimal ef-
fects, particularly from a long-term perspective (Rynes & Rosen, 1995).
Accountability
Having a sense of accountability, meaning “the implicit or explicit expectation that 
one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others,” can be 
another powerful measure to combat bias (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 255).  Re-
search finds that having a sense of accountability can decrease the influence of bias 
(Kang, et al., 2012; Reskin, 2005).  When decision makers are not held accountable 
for their actions, they are less likely to self-check for how bias may affect their de-
cision-making (National Center for State Courts).  Jurors’ feelings of being held 
accountable by the judge to produce unbiased decisions can help jurors keep their 
implicit biases in check (Kang, et al., 2012).
Fostering Egalitarian Motivations
Considerable research has shown that fostering egalitarian motivations can count-
er the activation of automatic stereotypes (Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006; Moskowitz, 
Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999).  Stone and Moskowitz write, “When activated, 
egalitarian goals inhibit stereotypes by undermining and counteracting the implicit 
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nature of stereotype activation, thereby cutting stereotypes off before they are brought 
to mind” (Stone & Moskowitz, 2011, p. 773).  For example, work by Dasgupta and 
Rivera found that automatic biases are not necessarily inevitable, as the relationship 
between automatic antigay prejudice and discrimination was moderated by individ-
uals’ conscious holding of egalitarian beliefs (Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006).
Taking the Perspective of Others
Another debiasing strategy that has gained some traction is when individuals take 
the perspective of someone who is different from them.  Across three experiments, 
Galinksy and Moskowitz found that perspective-taking was effective at debiasing, 
as it “tended to increase the expression of positive evaluations of the target, reduced 
the expression of stereotypic content, and prevented the hyperaccessibility of the 
stereotype construct” (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000, p. 720).    
Benforado and Hanson support perspective-taking as a debiasing tool, noting that 
considering opposing perspectives and fostering recognition of multiple perspectives 
are good techniques for reducing automatic biases (Benforado & Hanson, 2008). 
They caution, however, that this approach may have limited effects if individuals 
believe they have taken the perspective of others when in fact they have not been as 
successful at this venture as they judge themselves to be.  
Later empirical work by Todd et al. shed light on effects of perspective taking.  The 
researchers employed five experiments designed to assess whether taking the per-
spective of others could counter automatic expressions of racial bias.  Their findings 
found that this debiasing technique yielded “more favorable automatic interracial 
evaluations” (Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011, p. 1038). 
Taking the perspective of others can also be used in debiasing exercises.  When 
Stone and Moskowitz outlined the components of a cultural competency work-
shop for medical professionals that sought to educate them about implicit bias, the 
authors suggested that the medical professionals imagine themselves as a minority 
group patient and write a story about that person’s life (Stone & Moskowitz, 2011).
Finally, it is worth noting that perspective taking has benefits that extend beyond 
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debiasing.  For example, in the realm of healthcare, studies have shown that en-
couraging practitioners to take the perspective of others cultivates empathy, which 
leads to positive outcomes for patient satisfaction and treatment (see, e.g., Blatt, 
LaLacheur, Galinsky, Simmens, & Greenberg, 2010; Drwecki, Moore, Ward, & 
Prkachin, 2011).  
Deliberative Processing
Another technique that can counter implicit biases is to “engage in effortful, deliber-
ative processing” (Kang, et al., 2012, p. 1177).  This is particularly important for in-
dividuals who may be operating under time constraints or a weighty cognitive load, 
such as doctors and judges, because spontaneous judgments can provoke reliance on 
stereotypes (Burgess, 2010; Kang, et al., 2012).  To that end, Betancourt suggests 
that medical professionals constantly self-monitor their behaviors in an effort to 
offset implicit stereotyping (Betancourt, 2004).
In another manner of deliberative processing, Stone and Moskowitz encourage 
medical professionals to rethink the standard ways that patients are classified (e.g., 
race/ethnicity, gender, etc.) and instead focus on a common identity that they share 
with each patient (Stone & Moskowitz, 2011).  By activating this shared identity, 
the patient’s other identities (e.g., race/ethnicity) are not as prevalent in the medical 
professional’s mind, thus helping to counter the enactment of the implicit biases and 
stereotypes associated with those identities (Stone & Moskowitz, 2011).  
The significance of deliberative processing is reinforced by research that finds that 
even one’s emotional state can influence the activation and nature of implicit biases 
(Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009).  For example, DeSteno and 
colleagues examined how the creation of automatic outgroup prejudice can be af-
fected by emotional states, such as anger or sadness.  Using both an evaluative prim-
ing measure and the IAT, they found that an angry emotional state led to automatic 
prejudice against outgroups, which the researchers attributed to anger’s association 
with intergroup competition and conflict (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 
2004).  Thus, deliberate processing, including self-awareness of one’s own emotional 
state, plays a role in individuals’ ability to counter implicit biases.
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Other Interventions
As discussed in this final subsection, some researchers have developed specific inter-
ventions as a means of debiasing.  
As an extension of work that relied on counter-stereotypic exemplars, Foroni & 
Mayr showed how short fictional scenarios designed to present a counter-stereotyp-
ic example (in this case, flowers were regarded noxious while insects were positively 
regarded) had an immediate and automatic modulation of the IAT effect (Foroni 
& Mayr, 2005).  This same effect was not observed when subjects were simply asked 
to think of flowers as negative and insects as positive.  “These results suggest that a 
newly acquired knowledge structure targeting the abstract, category level can pro-
duce behavioral effects typically associated with automatic categorization” (Foroni 
& Mayr, 2005, p. 139).
A recent publication by Devine et al. highlights an intervention that is founded on 
the premise that “implicit bias is like a habit that can be broken through a combi-
nation of awareness of implicit bias, concern about the effects of that bias, and the 
application of strategies to reduce bias” (Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012, p. 
1267).  The logic here is that “breaking the habit” of implicit bias requires awareness 
of the contexts that can activate bias and knowledge of how to replace biased reac-
tions with ones that reflect a non-prejudiced mindset.  Devine and colleagues sought 
to assess whether interventions could yield long-term reductions in implicit racial 
bias.  They used a randomly controlled experimental design in which participants 
assigned to the intervention group engaged in a bias education and training pro-
gram that taught participants five strategies they could apply to different situations 
in their lives as appropriate (stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic imaging, 
individuation, perspective taking, and increasing opportunities for contact).  Results 
showed that the participants who had received this training had lower IAT scores 
than the control group participants, and unprecedentedly, this reduction in implicit 
race bias endured for at least eight weeks following the intervention (Devine, et al., 
2012).  Devine et al. attribute this decline in implicit bias to the multifaceted nature 
of the intervention rather than any specific aspect of the intervention.
Debiasing
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Conclusion
The aforementioned studies underscore the devastating impact of implicit racial bi-
ases with a focus on education, criminal justice, and health care.  These topics provide 
a mere snap shot of the range of realms affected by implicit biases.  Other researchers 
have documented the role of implicit bias in domains such as employment (see, e.g., 
Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Rooth, 2007) and aspects of the legal landscape, 
just to name a few (see, e.g., Brown, 2012).  Despite a plethora of scientific evidence, 
not all scholars are swayed by implicit bias research.  This final chapter summarizes 
some of the critiques implicit bias research has faced and concludes by offering some 
concrete steps for addressing implicit biases.
Critiques of Implicit Bias Research
Like most fields, implicit bias has been subject to criticism.  The following points 
capture a few of these critiques, many of which are summarized in Kang & Lane 
2010:
• It’s “junk science” – Some critics question the scientific validity of im-
plicit bias research, characterizing it as “motivated by junk scientists and 
their lawyer accomplices who manipulate data, misinterpret results, and 
exaggerate findings in order to snooker society into politically correct 
wealth transfers” (Kang & Lane, 2010, p. 504-505).  Kang and Lane ar-
gue against this so-called “backlash scholarship,” asserting that perfect 
knowledge of a concept should not be required given that the same lev-
el of scrutiny is not often inflicted upon the status quo (Kang & Lane, 
2010).  Others question measures of implicit bias because they are in-
direct in nature, thus any concept being studied relies on participants’ 
performance in another assignment, such as the sorting procedure in the 
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IAT (Nosek & Riskind, 2012).  Finally, other detractors remain unsat-
isfied with the results of scientific tests of validity (see, e.g., G. Mitchell 
& Tetlock, 2006), though a later meta-analysis by Greenwald and col-
leagues provided convincing evidence to counter many of these claims. 
• Implicit biases are “hardwired” – This stance asserts that implicit biases 
are immutable; therefore, we are unable to change them in any way.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the creation of new associations, while 
not easy, is generally now regarded as a feasible task (Blair, 2002; Dasgup-
ta & Greenwald, 2001; Devine, 1989; Kang, 2009; Kang & Lane, 2010). 
• Implicit biases are rational – Another objection to implicit bias re-
search contends that because implicit biases reflect reality, it is ratio-
nal to act on them accordingly (Kang & Lane, 2010).  This argument 
hinges on the apparent accuracy of individuals’ perceptions of reality. 
• Unclear and /or limited policy impacts – Implicit bias research has also 
been subject to criticism because its connection to social policy is not im-
mediately evident.  Policies generally aim at addressing behaviors rather 
than individuals’ thoughts, though one’s actions and mental processes are 
certainly interconnected (Nosek & Riskind, 2012).  However, Nosek and 
Riskind assert that implicit and explicit biases should be accounted for 
when crafting and implementing policy, because often policies are for-
mulated under the erroneous assumption that people’s behaviors are the 
result of completely conscious and intentional actions (Nosek & Riskind, 
2012).  
Criticism of the Implicit Association Test (IAT)
The Implicit Association Test, in particular, has been subject to a distinct set of crit-
icisms.  One argument asserts that the IAT is suspect because it is difficult to deter-
mine what exactly the IAT is measuring.  While the standard explanation is that the 
race IAT measures the attitudes that individuals hold toward specific groups, others 
have contended that IAT results may actually reflect test takers’ familiarity with 
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one group over another (e.g., greater familiarity with White people as opposed to 
Blacks) (Kinoshita & Peek-O’Leary, 2005).  This claim of familiarity tainting IAT 
results directly counters earlier work by Dasgupta and colleagues who documented 
the persistence of a pro-White bias on the race IAT even after accounting for famil-
iarity in their study design (Dasgupta, et al., 2000).  
A second measurement-based criticism that has been leveled against the IAT ques-
tions whether it is assessing individuals’ attitudes as purported, or whether it is actu-
ally measuring their cultural knowledge.  Some question whether anti-Black senti-
ments uncovered by the IAT actually reflect negative feelings associated with African 
Americans’ history of oppression versus personal anti-Black sentiments (Tetlock & 
Mitchell, 2008).  Other work by Nosek and Hansen counters this notion, as their 
findings across seven different studies yielded the conclusion that the association 
between implicit attitudes and cultural knowledge is weak and inconsistent (Nosek 
& Hansen, 2008).
Another critical line of questioning that the IAT has faced interrogates whether 
the IAT measures a stable attitude or if the context of the test instead yields “an 
experimentally induced momentary response to the mapping project subjects face” 
(Tinkler, 2012, p. 992).  In other words, this criticism questions the extent to which 
results are a methodological artifact of the IAT itself (Fiedler, et al., 2006; Tetlock 
& Mitchell, 2008).
Beyond the realm of measurement, another lingering criticism of the IAT is its reli-
ance on hypothetical situations.  Some argue that the contrived scenarios of the IAT 
calls into question the test’s predictive validity in real life situations.  Mitchell and 
Tetlock go so far as to list twelve specific ways in which implicit bias research labo-
ratory settings contrasts with what happens in real-life workplace settings (see pgs. 
1109-1110 in G. Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006).  In light of this criticism, researchers 
have begun crafting experiments that take advantage of non-hypothetical situations 
to assess how implicit biases affect behavior, such as Stepanikova and colleagues’ 
recent assessment of monetary generosity in light of IAT-measured implicit bias 
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scores (Stepanikova, Triplett, & Simpson, 2011).  
Steps for Addressing Implicit Biases
Rudman (2004) offers several suggestions for what to do about implicit biases.  They 
are summarized as follows:
• Increase awareness of the existence of implicit biases, because such ef-
forts “are critical to our ability to provide descriptions of social cogni-
tion that are faithful to human complexity, as well as to endeavors to 
combat automatic prejudice” (p. 138).  Dovidio et al. echo this man-
date and add to it by asserting that “as important first step is mak-
ing people aware of discrepancies between their conscious ide-
als and automatic negative responses” (Dovidio, et al., 1997, p. 535). 
• Invest energy into advocating for policies (e.g., affirma-
tive action) that can counter the effects of implicit bias. 
• Strive for an inclusive society, because “to the extent that societal evaluations 
color implicit biases, a more inclusive society should reduce them” (p. 138). 
• Provide people with opportunities to engage with out-
group members in contexts of mutual trust that al-
low for intergroup interactions to counter implicit biases. 
• Recognize that we may not be able to wholly ‘re-wire’ people’s implicit 
biases, but “what we can do is become aware of the power of implicit 
partisanship” (p. 139).
A Broader, Interdisciplinary Future
In addition to permeating public discourse, as noted in the introduction, implicit 
bias research is also attracting increased interest from academic fields within and 
outside of psychology.  Initiatives such as the Implicit Bias & Philosophy Inter-
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national Research Project4 seek to uncover ways in which these two fields, that are 
not traditionally aligned, may inform one another.  Efforts such as Project Implicit 
Mental Heath5 explore unconscious reactions to a range of mental health issues, 
including anxiety, depression, mental illness, and eating disorders.  These interdisci-
plinary ventures are likely to help shape the field of implicit bias in the years to come. 
4. For more information, please visit http://www.biasproject.org
5. For more information, please visit https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/user/pimh/index.jsp
Conclusion
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Judge Mark Bennett is a U.S. district judge in the Northern District of Iowa.  Before 
opening statements, he gives jurors the following instructions regarding implicit 
biases:
Appendix A: Judge Mark Bennett – Debiasing in 
the Courtroom
Appendix B: Glossary
Appendix
Above Average Effect
The Above Average Effect is a psychological phenomenon wherein individuals rate 
their own capabilities more highly than they regard those of other individuals.  This 
rating of oneself as consistently above average is also known as illusory superiority. 
In the context of implicit bias, one study asked a group of 36 judges whether they 
were in the top half of judges who could avoid prejudiced decision-making.  Re-
searchers cited the Above Average Effect when 97% of those judges placed them-
selves in the top half.  The Above Average Effect makes us think that we are the ones 
who are immune from bias.  
Activation
Activation refers to how different parts of the brain display more neural activity 
depending on the task a subject is performing.  Activation can be seen during Func-
– Kang & Lane, 2010, p. 500-501 –
““Do not decide the case based on ‘implicit biases.’  As we discussed in jury selection, every-one, including me, has feelings, assumptions, perceptions, fears, and stereotypes, that is, “implicit biases,” that we may not be aware of.  These hidden thoughts can impact what we see and hear, how we remember what we see and hear, and how we make import-ant decisions.  Because you are making very important decisions in this case, I strongly encourage you to evaluate the evidence carefully and to resist jumping to conclusions 
based on personal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut feelings, prejudices, sympathies, 
stereotypes, or biases.  The law demands that you return a just verdict, based solely on the 
evidence, your individual evaluation of that evidence, your reason and common sense, 
and these instructions.  Our system of justice is counting on you to render a fair decision 
based on the evidence, not on biases.
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tional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRIs) when sections of the brain “light up” 
due to increased blood flow.   
Afrocentric Features Bias
This form of bias refers to the generally negative judgments and beliefs that many 
people hold regarding individuals who possess particularly Afrocentric features, no-
tably dark skin, a wide nose, and full lips.  The presence of these features may activate 
associations that lead to stereotypical perceptions.  To illustrate, one study examined 
the Afrocentric features and sentences of convicted felons and found that when 
controlling for numerous factors (e.g., seriousness of the primary offense, number 
of prior offenses, number of additional concurrent offenses, etc.), individuals with 
the most prominent Afrocentric features received sentences of up to 56-64 months 
more prison time than their less Afrocentrically featured counterparts.  Thus, even 
judges, whose careers center on objectivity and fair sentencing, have been shown to 
possess Afrocentric features bias.
Amygdala
Considered part of the limbic system, the amygdala is located within the medial 
temporal lobe.  It plays a key role in how we process emotions, notably fear and plea-
sure.  The amygdala is involved with the expression of implicit attitudes; it activates 
when someone perceives threat or anxiety, such as when another individual appears 
untrustworthy.  In light of this, researchers have studied amygdala activation to bet-
ter understand Implicit Association Test results.  
Association
In psychology, the extent to which two concepts are connected in individuals’ minds 
is called an association.  For example, many associations reflect cultural stereotypes, 
such as youthfulness being associated with positive terms.  Associations are learned 
and developed over time; we are constantly absorbing and developing both posi-
tive and negative associations, even from a very young age.  Notwithstanding our 
external commitments to equality, fairness, and similar principles, we can still hold 
associations that reflect our implicit biases.
Attitude
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An attitude is an association between some concept (e.g., a social group) and the 
evaluation thereof, such as liking/disliking or favoring/disfavoring.  
Bias
A bias is a prejudice that leads to a tendency to favor one entity over another, often 
unfairly.  Biases can be explicit or implicit.
Categorical Boundaries
Categorical boundaries refer to the abstract and fluid “lines” we draw that separate 
one grouping from another, thereby creating categories.  These “lines” are malleable; 
they move to fit situational context.  For example, the categorical boundary that de-
fines the distinction between fast and slow changes depending on whether a vehicle 
is traveling 45 mph in a school zone versus an interstate highway.  
Concealed Bias
Concealed bias is explicit bias that one hides for purposes of impression manage-
ment.
Debiasing
Debiasing is the process of reducing susceptibility to implicit biases or dismantling 
them.  Starting with a conscious goal to be fair or simply being aware of implicit 
bias is not enough to remove, overcome, or dismantle its effects on decision-making. 
Instead, research studies highlight several techniques that have been shown to suc-
cessfully dismantle bias, including:
1. Social contact – Meaningful intergroup interactions allow us to find connec-
tions or links to people who are different from us.  This opportunity to relate 
to one another can help eliminate bias. 
2. Counter-stereotypic Training – Explicitly stating “no” when facing a stereo-
type can have a debiasing effect if this technique is practiced repeatedly and 
reinforced over time.
3. Cuing Positive Exemplars – Exposing people to images of outstanding and 
admired individuals who belong to groups that typically are stereotyped neg-
atively can reduce bias.  In one study, researchers found that implicit biases 
Appendix
STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2013www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu 74
for Whites decreased when exposing individuals to both admired Black and 
disliked White individuals.  
4. Counter-stereotypic Image Reinforcement – While it can be very hard to 
“unlearn” an association, teaching a new, different association can have posi-
tive effects.  Being exposed to images that counter stereotypes (e.g., a female 
scientist) can contribute to debiasing.  
Dissociations
Dissociations occur when an individual’s implicit and explicit attitudes on the same 
topic/object differ.  This suggests that implicit and explicit biases are related yet dis-
tinct mental constructs.  
Dual-Process Theory
Dual-Process Theory explores how phenomena can occur as a result of individuals’ 
reasoning occurring through two distinct processes.  One process is rapid, implicit, 
and occurs automatically; conversely, the second process is slower, controlled, and 
explicit.  This theory asserts that these two reasoning processes compete for control 
within individuals and influence their responses.
Explicit Attitudes and Beliefs
The opposite of implicit, explicit attitudes and beliefs are the ones that individuals 
profess publicly or express directly.  These attitudes and beliefs are conscious and 
acknowledged by the individual who holds them.  
Extinction 
Also known as reversal, extinction is the process of unlearning mental associations. 
Extinction conditions the brain to no longer respond in the same way to specific 
cues.  It can be used to dismantle implicit biases and is particularly effective when 
paired with counter-stereotypic image reinforcement, which refers to the viewing 
of images that are concrete examples designed to counter stereotypes (e.g., a female 
construction worker). 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
fMRI is a type of MRI that takes structural pictures of the brain.  More specifically, 
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fMRIs measure and record brain activity by detecting blood flow, thus allowing sci-
entists to understand the brain’s neural activity in a continuous and dynamic manner. 
In implicit bias studies involving fMRIs, researchers ask subjects to think specific 
thoughts or perform certain tasks and then examine which portions of the brain 
image “light up” or are activated, thus providing insights into the subject’s mind 
processes.     
Illusion of Objectivity
Built on the idea of detached impartiality, the illusion of objectivity refers to the false 
impression that one may be free from biases, opinions, and other subjective influenc-
es.  Under the illusion of objectivity, we think that we are the only people who are 
objective, whereas everyone else is biased.  In short, the illusion of objectivity is a bias 
that makes us think we are not actually biased.  Psychological research has shown 
that we all harbor implicit biases, regardless of how strong our desires are to be un-
biased or neutral.  In legal settings, judges should acknowledge the illusion of sub-
jectivity lest they become overconfident in their ability to make impartial judgments. 
Implicit Association Text (IAT)
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is a computer-based test that measures the 
strength of associations individuals hold on an unconscious (or implicit) level.  It 
measures associations and stereotypes that people often do not even realize they 
possess.  In the IAT, participants pair two concepts (e.g., men and career vs. men and 
family) and the test measures the speed with which participants are able to classify 
words and images related to these concepts.  The more closely associated the con-
cepts are in the participants’ minds (e.g., women and family), the more rapidly they 
will be able to respond; conversely, concepts that are not as strongly associated (e.g., 
women and career) take longer to classify.  The speed with which individuals make 
these classifications sheds light on the associations they hold and the strength of 
those associations.  Researchers contend that association strengths are at the heart 
of individuals’ attitudes and stereotypes.
Implicit Bias
Also known as unconscious or hidden bias, implicit biases are negative associations 
that people unknowingly hold.  They are expressed automatically without conscious 
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awareness.  Many studies have indicated that implicit biases affect individuals’ at-
titudes and actions, thus creating real-world implications even though individuals 
may not even be aware that these biases exist within themselves.  Notably, implicit 
biases have been shown to trump individuals’ stated commitments to equality and 
fairness, thereby producing behavior that diverges from the explicit attitudes that 
many people profess.  The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is often used to measure 
implicit biases with regard to race, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, and other 
topics.        
  
Ingroup 
An ingroup is a group with which one feels a sense of membership, solidarity, or 
shared interest.  Ingroup membership may be established along numerous identities, 
such as race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. 
Ingroup Bias
Ingroup bias refers to the positive attitudes that people tend to feel towards member 
of their ingroup.  Feelings of safety and familiarity are often associated with ingroup 
members.  Research has shown that people are inclined to forgive members of their 
ingroup more quickly than they are members of outgroups.
Insula / Insular Cortex
Located deep within the brain between the temporal lobe and the parietal lobe, 
the insula is involved in several processes, including risky decision-making, bodily 
awareness, and certain aspects of motor control.  It is also the part of the brain that 
is involved in the experience of disgust with respect to both smells and sights, even 
if these cues are only imagined.  As such, neuroscientists often look for activation 
in the insula when studying implicit biases that prompt strong feelings of disgust in 
research subjects.  
Outgroup
In contrast to ingroups, outgroups are groups with which one does not belong or 
associate.  As a byproduct of ingroup favoritism, some people feel a sense of dislike 
or contempt toward members of outgroups.
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Positivity Bias
When we evaluate our abilities to be better than average, or better than they actually 
are, we are engaging in positivity bias.  This form of bias involves making predom-
inantly favorable judgments.  More specifically, positivity bias can also refer to the 
attribution of individuals’ successes to internal factors while explaining their failures 
through citing external factors.
Schema
A schema is a mental shortcut we automatically use to organize and categorize the 
vast amounts of information we encounter in our daily lives.  As mental “blueprints,” 
schemata streamline information processing by creating generalized categories and 
expectations for objects, events, places, people, and so on.  These abstract represen-
tations are often but not necessarily always accurate.  Schemata unfortunately can 
contribute to stereotyping and prejudice when they cause people to misinterpret 
situations or exclude information in order to conform to pre-existing schemata.  This 
can perpetuate implicit biases.     
Shooter Bias  
Shooter bias is a term that emerged from research studies that examined subjects’ 
reactions to a series of images of Black or White men.  In the images, the men were 
holding either a gun or a benign object such as a can of soda pop.  On the comput-
erized test, participants were instructed to “shoot” if the man was holding a gun, 
refrain if he was holding any other object, and make this decision as quickly as pos-
sible.  Shooter bias reflects the finding that participants made faster decisions and 
were more likely to shoot when the image depicted a Black man, even when this was 
an erroneous decision and the Black man was not actually wielding a gun.  
Stereotype
A stereotype is a standardized and simplified belief about the attributes of a social 
group.  Although not always accurate, stereotypes are often widely held and can have 
both positive and negative impacts of individuals.  The act of stereotyping involves 
both activation (making the cognitive association) and application (using that asso-
ciation to make a judgment about a person or group).       
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